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THE proposition that legal rules can be understood only with reference
to the purposes they serve would today scarcely be regarded as an excit-
ing truth. The notion that law exists as a means to an end has been
commonplace for at least half a century. There is, however, no justifica-
tion for assuming, because this attitude has now achieved respectability,
and even triteness, that it enjoys a pervasive application in practice.
Certainly there are even today few legal treatises of which it may be
said that the author has throughout clearly defined the purposes which
his definitions and distinctions serve. We are still all too willing to
embrace the conceit that it is possible to manipulate legal concepts with-
out the orientation which comes from the simple inquiry: toward what
end is this activity directed? Nietzsche's observation, that the most com-
mon stupidity consists in forgetting what one is trying to do, retains a
discomforting relevance to legal science.
In no field is this more true than in that of damages. In the assessment
of damages the law tends to be conceived, not as a purposive ordering
of human affairs, but as a kind of juristic mensuration. The language
of the decisions sounds in terms not of command but of discovery. We
measure the extent of the injury; we determine whether it was caused
by the defendant's act; we ascertain whether the plaintiff has included
the same item of damage twice in his complaint. One unfamiliar with
the unstated premises which language of this sort conceals might almost
be led to suppose that Rochester produces some ingenious instrument
by which these calculations are accomplished.
It is, as a matter of fact, clear that the things which the law of dam-
ages purports to "measure" and "determine"--the "injuries", "items
of damage", "causal connections", etc.-are in considerable part its
own creations, and that the process of "measuring" and "determining"
them is really a part of the process of creating them. This is obvious
when courts work on the periphery of existing doctrine, but it is no less
true of fundamental and established principles. For example, one fre-
quently finds the "normal" rule of contract damages (which awards
to the promisee the value of the expectancy, "the lost profit") treated
as a mere corollary of a more fundamental principle, that the purpose
of granting damages is to make "compensation" for injury.1 Yet in this
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1. "In fixing the amount of these damages, the general purpose of the law is, and
should be, to give compensation :--that is, to put the plaintiff in as good a position as
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case we "compensate" the plaintiff by giving him something he never
had. This seems on the face of things a queer kind of "compensation".
We can, to be sure, make the term "compensation" seem appropriate by
saying that the defendant's breach "deprived" the plaintiff of the expect-
ancy. But this is in essence only a metaphorical statement of the effect
of the legal rule. In actuality the loss which the plaintiff suffers (depriva-
tion of the expectancy) is not a datum of nature but the reflection of a
normative order. It appears as a "loss" only by reference to ant un-
stated ought. Consequently, when the law gauges damages by the value
of the promised performance it is not merely measuring a quantum, but
is seeking an end, however vaguely conceived this end may be.
It is for this reason that it is impossible to separate the law of con-
tract damages from the larger body of motives and policies which con-
stitutes the general law of contracts. It is, unfortunately for the sim-
plicity of our subject, impossible to assume that the purposive and
policy-directed element of contract law has been exhausted in the rules
which define contract and breach. If this were possible the law of con-
tract damages would indeed be simple, and we would have but one
measure of recovery for all contracts. Of course this is not the case.
What considerations influence the setting up of different measures of
recovery for different kinds of contracts? What factors explain the
rather numerous exceptions to the normal rule which measures damages
by the value of the expectancy? It is clear that these questions cannot
be answered without-an inquiry into the reasons which underlie (or may
underlie) the enforcement of promises generally.
In our own discussion we shall attempt first an analysis of the pur-
poses which may be pursued in awarding contract damages or in "en-
forcing" contracts generally; then we shall attempt to inquire to what
extent, and under what circumstances, these purposes have found ex-
pression in the decisions and doctrinal discussions. As the title suggests,
the primary emphasis will be on what we call "the reliance interest" as
a possible measure of recovery in suits for breach of contract.
THE PURPOSES PURSUED IN AWARDING CONTRACT DAMAGES
It is convenient to distinguish three principal purposes which may be
pursued in awarding contract damages. These purposes, and the situa-
tions in which they become appropriate, may be stated briefly as follows:
First, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant con-
ferred some value on the defendant. The defendant fails to perform
his promise. The court may force the defendant to disgorge the value
he would have been in had the defendant kept his contract." 3 ,VrwsTr, Co,.,rAcrs
(1920) §1338.
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he received from the plaintiff. The object here may be termed the pre-
vention of gain by the defaulting promisor at the expense of the promisee;
more briefly, the prevention of unjust enrichment. The interest protected
may be called the restitution interest. For our present purposes it is
quite immaterial how the suit in such a case be classified, whether as con-
tractual or quasi-contractual, whether as a suit to enforce the contract
or as a suit based upon a rescission of the contract. These questions
relate to the superstructure of the law, not to the basic policies with
which we are concerned.
Secondly, the plaintiff has in reliance on the promise of the defendant
changed his position. For example, the buyer under a contract for the
sale of land has incurred expense in the investigation of the. seller's title,
or has neglected the opportunity to enter other contracts. We may award
damages to the plaintiff for the purpose of undoing the harm which his
reliance on the defendant's promise has caused him. Our object is to
put him in as good a position as he was in before the promise was made.
The interest protected in this case may be called the reliance interest.
Thirdly, without insisting on reliance by the promisee or enrichment
of the promisor, we may seek to give the promisee the value of the
expectancy which the promise created. We may in a suit for specific
performance actually compel the defendant to render the promised per-
formance to the plaintiff, or, in a suit for damages, we may make the
defendant pay the money value of this performance. Here our object
is to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied
had the defendant performed his promise. The interest protected in this
case we may call the expectation interest.
It will be observed that what we have called the restitution interest
unites two elements: (1) reliance by the promisee, (2) a resultant gain
to the promisor. It may for some purposes be necessary to separate these
elements. In some cases a defaulting promisor may after his breach be
left with an unjust gain which was not taken from the promisee (a
third party furnished the consideration), or which was not the result
of reliance by the promisee (the promisor violated a promise not to
appropriate the promisee's goods). Even in those cases where the promi-
sor's gain results from the promisee's reliance it may happen that damages
will be assessed somewhat differently, depending on whether we take
the promisor's gain or the promisee's loss as the standard of measure-
ment.2 Generally, however, in the cases we shall be discussing, gain by
2. Thus in Johnston v. Star Bucket Pump Co., 274 Mo. 414. 202 S. W. 1143 (1918),
a building contractor was allowed to recover in quantum meruit for part performance
a sum considerably larger than his out-of-pocket loss. The discrepancy between the
reasonable value of his part performance and its actual cost to him arose from the
fact that he had made very favorable contracts with subcontractors. In such a case the
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the promisor will be accompanied by a corresponding and, so far as its
legal measurement is concerned, identical loss to the promisee, so that
for our purposes the most workable classification is one which presup-
poses in the restitution interest a correlation of promisor's gain and
promisee's loss. If, as we shall assume, the gain involved in the restitu-
tion interest results from and is identical with the plaintiff's loss through
reliance, then the restitution interest is merely a special case of the reliance
interest; all of the cases coming under the restitution interest will be
covered by the reliance interest, and the reliance interest will be broader
than the restitution interest only to the extent that it includes cases
where the plaintiff has relied on the defendant's promise without enrich-
ing the defendant.
It should not be supposed that the distinction here taken between the
reliance and expectation interests coincides with that sometimes taken
between "losses caused" (damnum emergens) and "gains prevented"
(lucrum cessans).' In the first place, though reliance ordinarily results
in "losses" of an affirmative nature (expenditures of labor and money)
it is also true that opportunities for gain may be foregone in reliance
on a promise. Hence the reliance interest must be interpreted as at
least potentially covering "gains prevented" as well as "losses caused".
(Whether "gains prevented" through reliance on a promise are properly
compensable in damages is a question not here determined. Obviously,
certain scruples concerning "causality" and "foreseeability" are sug-
gested. It is enough for our present purpose to note that there is noth-
ing in the definition of the reliance interest itself which would exclude
items of this sort from consideration.) 4 On the other hand, it is not
restitution interest (if we mean by that, compelling the defendant to disgorge) is broader
than the reliance interest. It should be pointed out, however, that in a suit for "damages"
asking reimbursement for reliance plus the lost profit (RsTmimrr, Co,.TnAcrs (1932)
§333) the saving on the subcontracts, which in the Johnston case was reflected in an
increased "reasonable value" of the plaintiff's performance, would have been reflected in
the lost profit.
In Cincinnati Siemens Lungren Gas Illuminating Co. v. Western Siemens Lungren
Co., 152 U. S. 200 (1893), damages for breach of a contract not to compete were restricted
to the profit realized by the party guilty of breach. It was assumed, however, that the
promisee's loss was at least equal to the defaulter's gain, and the limitation of recovery
to the defaulter's profit was imposed partly on the ground that there existed no adequate
factual basis for determining the business lost to the promisee. In 6 DFnuCo;u, TnAITr-
DES OBLIGATIONS (1931) §287, the view is expressed that the gain of the defaulter is
acceptable as a measure of damages only as a kind of surrogate for the more usual rule
measuring damages by the creditor's prospective gain.
3. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §329.
4. The German Civil Code limits relief on contract in certain situations to the "nega-
tive" (ie. reliance) interest. The "negative interest" is assumed to cover gains prevented
(eintgangenzer Gewinn) as well as positive losses. See the annotation to §122 in Buscr,
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possible to make the expectation interest entirely synonymous with "gains
prevented". The disappointment of an expectancy often entails losses
of a positive character.5
It is obvious that the three "interests" we have distinguished do not
present equal claims to judicial intervention. It may be assumed that
ordinary standards of justice would regard the need for judicial inter-
vention as decreasing in the order in which we have listed the three
interests. The "restitution interest," involving a combination of 'unjust
impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest case for relief.
If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice as the main-
tenance of an equilibrium of goods among members of society, the
restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim to judicial inter-
vention as the reliance interest, since if A not only causes B to lose one
unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the resulting discrepancy be-
tween A and B is not one unit but two.'
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the prom-
ise, even though he may not thereby have enriched the promisor, .certainly
presents a more pressing case for relief than the promisee who merely
demands satisfaction for his disappointment in not getting what was
promised him. In passing from compensation for change of position to
compensation for loss of expectancy we pass, to use Aristotle's terms
again, from the realm of corrective justice to that of distributive jus-
tice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a disturbed status quo,
but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to act defensively or
restoratively, and assumes a more active role.7 With the transition, the
DAS BGERLICHE GESETZBUCH (1929). But apparently the loss of the particular gain must
under the circumstances have been foreseeable as a probable consequence of the contract.
See §252 and its annotation.
5. For example, in Eastern Advertising Co. v. Shapiro, 263 Mass. 228, 161 N. E. 240
(1928), the defendant's failure to take advertising space on certain billboards made it
necessary for the plaintiff to expend money in placing "fillers" on the boards.
6. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs, 1132a-1132b.
7. "No doubt, when, after having an object delivered, or profiting from a service, I
refuse to furnish a suitable equivalent, I take from another what belongs-to him, and we
can say that society, by obliging me to keep my promise, is only preventing an injury, an
indirect aggression. But if I have simply promised a service without having previously
received remuneration, I am not less held to keep my engagement. [This is true in Anglo-
American law in the case of the bilateral contract.] In this case, however, I do not enrich
myself at the expense of another; I only refuse to be useful to him." DuRXHEIM, ON THE
DivisioN OF LABOR IN SocITr (Simpson's trans. 1933) 217. Where the defendant has
not already received some remuneration, the enforcement of the contract is viewed by
Durkheim as having "an eminently positive nature, since it has for its purpose the de-
termination of the way in which we ought to cooperate." Id. at 216.
". .. [T]he principle that promise or consent creates obligation is foreign to the idea
of justice. . . . It is plain that if anyone promises a friend to give him something and
does not do it, he does not commit an injustice,-at least, understand, if he does not wrong
[Vol. 46, 52
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justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality. It is as a mat-
ter of fact no easy thing to explain why the normal rule of contract
recovery should be that which measures damages by the value of the
promised performance. Since this "normal rule" throws its shadow across
our whole subject it will be necessary to examine the possible reasons
for its existence. It may be said parenthetically that the discussion which
follows, though directed primarily to the normal measure of recovery
where damages are sought, also has relevance to the more general ques-
tion, why should a promise which has not been relied on ever be enforced
at all, whether by a decree of specific performance or by an award of
damages?
It should also be said that our discussion of "reasons" does not claim
to coincide in all particulars with the actual workings of the judicial
mind, certainly not with those of any single judicial mind. It is unfortu-
nately very difficult to discuss the possible reasons for rules of law with-
out unwittingly conveying the impression that these "reasons" are the
things which control the daily operations of the judicial process. This
has had the consequence, at a time when men stand in dread of being
labelled "unrealistic", that we have almost ceased to talk about reasons
altogether. Those who find unpalatable the rationalistic flavor of what
follows are invited to view what they read not as law but as an excursus
into legal philosophy, and to make whatever discount that distinction may
seem to them to dictate.
WHY SHOULD THE LAW E VER PROTECT THE EXPECTATION INTEREST?
Perhaps the most obvious answer to this question is one which we may
label "psychological". This answer would run something as follows:
The breach of a promise arouses in the promisee a sense of injury. This
feeling is not confined to cases where the promisee has relied on the
promise. Whether or not he has actually changed his position because
of the promise, the promisee has formed an attitude of expectancy such
that a breach of the promise causes him to feel that he has been "deprived"
of something which was "his". Since this sentiment is a relatively uni-
form one, the law has no occasion to go back of it. It accepts it as a
datum and builds its rule about it.'
The difficulty with this explanation is that the law does in fact go
back of the sense of injury which the breach of a promise engenders.
this friend indirectly." TotrRTouLoN, PELzosoPHY x rME Dzvnx.opu:T or LAW (Read's
trans. 1922) 499-500.
8. This is essentially the view of Schlossmann, though one discerns in his discusion an
admixture of elements from what is called later in the text the "economic" or "institu-
tional" explanation. Scanossu".w, DER VMraAG (1876) §36.
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No legal system attempts to invest with juristic sanction all promises.
Some rule or combination of rules effects a sifting out for enforcement
of those promises deemed important enough to society to justify the
law's concern with them. Whatever the principles which control this
sifting out process may be, they are not convertible into terms of the
degree of resentment which the breach of a particular kind of promise
arouses. Therefore, though it may be assumed that the impulse to assuage
disappointment is one shared by those who make and influence the law,
this impulse can hardly be regarded as the key which solves the" whole
problem of the protection accorded by the law to the expectation interest.
A second possible explanation for the rule protecting the expectancy
may be found in the much-discussed "will theory" of contract law. This
theory views the contracting parties as exercising, so to speak, a legis-
lative power, so that the legal enforcement of a contract becomes merely
an implementing by the state of a kind of private law already established
by the parties. If A has made, in proper form, a promise to pay B
one thousand dollars, we compel A to pay this sum simply because the
rule or lex set up by the parties calls for this payment. Uti lingua min-
cupassit, ita iis esto.9
It is not necessary to discuss here the contribution which the will
theory is capable of making to a philosophy of contract law. Certainly
some borrowings from the theory are discernable in most attempts to
rationalize the bases of contract liability. It is enough to note here that
while the will theory undoubtedly has some bearing on the problem of
contract damages, it cannot be regardedt as dictating in all cases a re-
covery of the expectancy. If a contract represents a kind of private
law, it is a law which usually says nothing at all about what shall be
done when it is violated. A contract is in this respect like an imperfect
statute which provides no penalties, and which leaves it to the courts
to find a way to effectuate its purposes. There would, therefore, be no
necessary contradiction between the will theory and a rule which limited
damages to the reliance interest. Under such a rule the penalty for
violating the norm established by the contract would simply consist in
being compelled to compensate the other party for detrimental reliance.
Of course there may be cases where the parties have so obviously antici-
pated. that a certain form of judicial relief will be given that we can,
without stretching things, say that by implication they have "willed"
that this relief should be given. This attitude finds a natural applica-
tion to promises to pay a definite sum of money. But certainly as to most
9. "A legal transaction is the exercise of the creative power which the private will
possesses in legal matters. The individual commands, and the law adopts his command as
its own." WINDSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS (9th ed. 1906) § 68, n. Ia.
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types of contracts it is vain to expect from the will theory a ready-made
solution for the problem of damages.
A third and more promising solution of our difficulty lies in an
economic or institutional approach. The essence of a credit economy
lies in the fact that it tends to eliminate the distinction between present
and future (promised) goods. Expectations of future values become,
for purposes of trade, present values. In a society in which credit has
become a significant and pervasive institution, it is inevitable that the
expectancy created by an enforceable promise should be regarded as a
kind of property, and breach of the promise as an injury to that property.
In such a society the breach of a promise works an "actual" diminution
of the promisee's assets-"actual" in the sense that it would be so ap-
praised according to modes of thought which enter into the very fiber
of our economic system. That the promisee had not "used" the property
which the promise represents (had not relied on the promise) is as im-
material as the question whether the plaintiff in trespass quare clausum
fregit was using his property at the time it was encroached upon. The
analogy to ordinary forms of property goes further, for even in a suit
for trespass the recovery is really for an expectancy, an expectancy of
possible future uses. Where the property expectancy is limited (as where
the plaintiff has only an estate for years) the recovery is reduced ac-
cordingly."0 Ordinary property differs from a contract right chiefly in
the fact that it lies within the power of more persons to work a direct
injury to the expectancy it represents. It is generally only the promisor
or some one working through or upon him who is able to injure the
contract expectancy in a direct enough manner to make expedient legal
intervention.
The most obvious objection which can be made to the economic or
institutional explanation is that it involves a petitio principii. A promise
has present value, why? Because the law enforces it. "The expectancy,"
10. Commons remarks that "AacLeod's view of a debt as an economic commodity was
"so strange to the economists that they could not understand it . . . Its strangeness to
the classical economists consisted in that it contained Futurity as one of its dimensions,
as well as the use-v.alue and scarcity value of the older schools. Yet futurity is the essence
of the ownership side of a commodity, which they had taken for granted." IsTr=onA.
EcoNomics (1934) 394.
"We are accustomed to conceive of the breach of a promise under an entirely different
point of view from that which we apply to injuries to property, and the notion that the
enforcement of a promise may be equivalent to compensation for an injury to property is
foreign to us. That this manner of viewing the thing arbitrarily separates things which
belong together can be shown by an analysis of the notion of property damage." Scuitoss-
MANN, DER VFRTRAG (1876) §37. Schlossmann goes on to show that damage to "prop-
erty" is really damage to an expectancy. Specific performance is for Schlossmann just as
much reparation for a wrong as is a mandatory injunction ordering a tortfeasor to rebuild
property he has destroyed. Id. at §39.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
regarded as a present value, is not the cause of legal intervention but
the consequence of it. This objection may be reinforced by a reference
to legal history. Promises were enforced long before there was anything
corresponding to a general system of "credit", and recovery was from
the beginning measured by the value of the promised performance, the
"agreed price". It may therefore be argued that the "credit system" when
it finally emerged was itself in large part built on the foundations Qf a
juristic development which preceded it.
The view just suggested aserts the primacy of law over economics;
it sees law not as the creature but as the creator of social institutions.
The shift of emphasis thus implied suggests the possibility of a fourth
explanation for the law's protection of the unrelied-on expectancy, which
we may call juristic. This explanation would seek a justification for the
normal rule of recovery in some policy consciously pursued by courts
and other lawmakers. It would assume that courts have protected the
expectation interest because they have considered it wise to do so, not
through a blind acquiescence in habitual ways of thinking and feeling,
or through an equally blind deference to the individual will. Approach-
ing the problem from this point of view, we are forced to find not a
mere explanation for the rule in the form of some sentimental, volitional,
or institutional datum, but articulate reasons for its existence.
What reasons can be advanced? In the first place, even if our interest
were confined to protecting promisees against an out-of-pocket loss, it
would still be possible to justify the rule granting the value of the ex-
pectancy, both as a cure for, and as a prophylaxis against, losses of this
sort.
It is a cure for these losses in the sense that it offers the measure of
recovery most likely to reimburse the plaintiff for the (often very numer-
ous and very difficult to prove) individual acts and forbearances which
make up his total reliance on the contract. It we take into account "gains
prevented" by reliance, that is. losses involved in foregoing the oppor-
tunity to enter other contracts, the notion that the rule protecting the
expectancy is adopted as the most effective means of compensating for
detrimental reliance seems not at all far-fetched. Physicians with an
extensive practice often charge their patients the full office call fee for
broken appointments. Such a charge looks on the face of things like
a claim to the promised fee; it seems to be based on the "expectation
interest". Yet the physician making the charge will quite justifiably re-
gard it as compensation for the loss of the opportunity to gain a similar
fee from a different patient. This foregoing of other opportunities is
involved to some extent in entering most contracts, and the impossibility
of subjecting this type of reliance to any kind of measurement may justify
a categorical rule granting the value of the expectancy as the most effec-
tive way of compensating for such losses.
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The rule that the plaintiff must after the defendant's breach take steps
to mitigate damages'1 tends to corroborate the suspicion that there lies
hidden behind the protection of the expectancy a concern to compensate
the plaintiff for the loss of the opportunity to enter other contracts.
Vhere after the defendant's breach the opportunity remains open to the
plaintiff to sell his services or goods elsewhere, or to fill his needs from
another source, he is bound to embrace that opportunity. Viewed in this
way the rule of "avoidable harms" is a qualification on the protection
accorded the expectancy, since it means that the plaintiff, in those cases
where it is applied, is protected only to the extent that he has in reliance
on the contract foregone other equally advantageous opportunities for
accomplishing the same end.
But, as we have suggested, the rule measuring damages by the ex-
pectancy may also be regarded as a prophylaxis against the losses result-
ing from detrimental reliance. Whatever tends to discourage breach of
contract tends to prevent the losses occasioned through reliance. Since
the expectation interest furnishes a more easily administered measure of
recovery than the reliance interest, it will in practice offer a more effective
sanction against contract breach.' 2 It is therefore possible to view the
rule measuring damages by the expectancy in a quasi-criminal aspect,
its purpose being not so much to compensate the promisee as to penalize
breach of promise by the promisor. The rule enforcing the unrelied-on
promise finds the same justification, on this theory, as an ordinance
which fines a man for driving through a stop-light when no other vehicle
is in sight.
In seeking justification for the rule granting the value of the expec-
tancy there is no need, however, to restrict ourselves by the assumption,
hitherto made, that the rule can only be intended to cure or prevent the
losses caused by reliance. A justification can be developed from a less
negative point of view. It may be said that there is not only a policy
in favor of preventing and undoing the harms resulting from reliance,
but also a policy in favor of promoting and facilitating reliance on busi-
ness agreements. As in the case of the stop-light ordinance we are in-
terested not only in preventing collisions but in speeding traffic. Agree-
ments can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless
they are made the basis for action. When business agreements are not
only made but are also acted on, the division of labor is facilitated, goods
find their way to the places where they are most needed, and economic
activity is generally stimulated. These advantages would be threatened
11. RESTATEmEnT. Co.=NAcrs (1932) §336; McComzcK, DA.&AGEs (1935) §§33-42.
12. It has been suggested as a partial justification for the rule measuring damages in
deceit by the expectancy, that it offers a more effective deterrent to fraud than the rule
limiting recovery to the out-of-pocket loss. McConmxcn, DAMAGEs (1935) 453.
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by any rule which limited legal protection to the reliance interest. Such
a rule would in practice tend to discourage reliance. The difficulties in
proving reliance and subjecting it to pecuniary measurement are such that
the business man knowing, or sensing, that these obstacles stood in the
way of judicial relief would hesitate to rely on a promise in any case
where the legal sanction was of significance to him. To encourage reli-
ance we must therefore dispense with its proof. For this reason it has
been found wise to make recovery on a promise independent of reliance,
both in the sense that in some cases the promise is enforced though not
relied on (as in the bilateral business agreement) and in the sense that
recovery is not limited to the detriment incurred in reliance.
The juristic explanation in its final form is then twofold. It rests
the protection accorded the expectancy on (1) the need for curing and
preventing the harms occasioned by reliance, and (2) on the need for
facilitating reliance on business agreements. From this spelling out of
a possible juristic explanation, it is clear that there is no incompatibility
between it and the economic or institutional explanation. They view the
same phenomenon from two different aspects. The essence of both of
them lies in the word "credit." The economic explanation views credit
from its institutional side; the juristic explanation views it from its
rational side. The economic view sees credit as an accepted way of liv-
ing; the juristic view invites us to explore the considerations of utility
which underlie this way of living, and the part which conscious human
direction has played in bringing it into being.
The way in which these two points of view supplement one another
becomes clearer when we .examine separately the.6conomic implications
of the two aspects of the juristic explanation. If we rest the legal
argument for measuring damages by the expectancy on the ground
that this procedure offers the most satisfactory means of compensating
the plaintiff for the loss of other opportunities to contract, it is clear
that the force of the argument will depend entirely upon the existing
economic environment. It would be most forceful in a hypothetical
society in which all values were available on the market and where all
markets were "perfect" in the economic sense. In such a* society there
would be no difference between the reliance interest and the expectation
interest. The plaintiff's loss in foregoing to enter another contract would
be identical with the expectation value of the contract he did make. The
argument that granting the value of the expectancy merely compensates
for that loss, loses force to the extent that actual conditions depart from
those of such a hypothetical society. These observations make it clear
why the development of open markets for goods tends to carry in its
wake the view that a contract claim is a kind of property, a conception
which-for all the importance he attached to it-MacLeod seemed to
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regard as the product of a kind of legal miracle. He who by entering
one contract passes by the opportunity to accomplish the same end else-
where will not be inclined to regard contract breach lightly or as a mere
matter of private morality. The consciousness of what is foregone re-
inforces the notion that the contract creates a "right" and that the
contract claim is itself a species of property.
If, on the other hand, we found the juristic explanation on the desire
to promote reliance on contracts, it is not difficult again to trace a cor-
respondence between the legal view and the actual conditions of economic
life. In general our courts and our economic institutions attribute special
significance to the same types of promises. The bilateral business agree-
ment is, generally speaking, the only type of informal contract our courts
are willing to enforce without proof that reliance has occurred-simply
for the sake of facilitating reliance. This is, by no accident, precisely
the kind of contract (the "exchange", "bargain", "trade", "deal") which
furnishes the indispensable and pervasive framework for the "unman-
aged" portions of our economic activity."
The inference is therefore justified that the ends of the law of con-
tracts and those of our economic system show an essential correspond-
ence. One may explain this either on the ground that the law (mere
superstructure and ideology) reflects inertly the conditions of economic
life, or on the ground that economic activity has fitted itself into the
rational framework of the law. Neither explanation would be true. In
fact we are dealing with a situation in which law and society have inter-
acted. The law measures damages by the expectancy in part because
society views the expectancy as a present value; society views the ex-
pectancy as a present value in part because the law (for reasons more
or .less consciously articulated) gives protection to the expectancy.
The combined juristic and economic explanation which has just been
developed may seem vulnerable to one serious objection. This lies in the
fact that the "normal" rule, which measures damages by the expectancy,
13. In referring by implication to a species of economic activity which is "managed"
we do not have in mind exclusively or even primarily management by the state, but rather
those means of organizing economic activity which Commons classifies as rationing and
managerial transactions. As Marx was fond of pointing out, contract has always played
a very small role in the internal organization of the factory. The enormous growth of the
corporation since his time has meant a further decrease in the importance of contract as
an organizing force, since the corporation and vertical integration tend to substitute for
an organization resting on contract one resting on the relation of superior and inferior
(management) and on "rationing transactions" (cf. the fiduciary duties of boards of
directors). Adam Smith's assumption, that free contract is the sole cause of the division
of labor, is to be explained as resting not simply on the conditions of his time, but also as
due in part to his preoccupation (despite the title of his great work) with distributive as
against productive economic activity, or, in Commons' terms, with scarcity rather than
with efficiency.
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has been frequently applied to promises of a type having no conceivable
relation to "the credit system," the division of labor, or the organiza-
tion of economic activity. Professor Williston apparently goes so far
as to assume that the "normal" rule is the only permissible rule of re-
covery even in the case of promises made enforceable by § 90 of the
Contracts Restatement, that is, in the case of promises for which no
price has been given or promised and which are enforced only because
they have been seriously relied on.14 Most of the arguments for' the
rule measuring damages by the expectancy which we developed under
our combined economic and juristic explanation have no application to
such promises. The suggestion that the expectation interest is adopted
as a kind of surrogate for the reliance interest because of the difficulty of
14. "Mr. Coudert: . . . Would you say, Mr. Reporter, in your case of Johnny and
the uncle, the uncle promising the $1,000 and Johnny buying the car-say he goes out and
buys the car for $500-that uncle would be liable for $1,000 or would he be liable for $500?
"Mr. Williston: If Johnny had done what he was expected to do, or is acting within
the limits of his uncle's expectation, I think the uncle would be liable for $1,000; but not
otherwise.
"Mr. Coudert: In other words, substantial justice would require that uncle should be
penalized in the sum of $500.
"Mr. Williston: Why do you say 'penalized'?
. . .Mr. Coudert: Because substantial justice there would require, it seems to me,-
that Johnny get his money for the car, but should he get his car and $500 more? I
don't see.
"Mr. Williston: Of course, it would be possible to say that for Section 88 [now §90]
should be substituted a section in the restatement of quasi-contract that under these cir-
cumstances the promisee should be allowed to recover such a sum as would represent
the injury he had suffered. . .' Quoted from the discussion of what is now §90 of the
CONTRAcrs RESTATEmENT reported in AmuIcAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROCEEDINGS, Vol. IV,
Appendix (1926) 98-99.
In a later discussion of the case of uncle and Johnny, Professor Williston was reported
as saying in answer to a repetition of the question why Johnny should receive more than
$500, "Either the promise is binding or it is not. If the promise is binding it has to be
enforced as it is made. As I said to Mr. Coudert, I could leave this whole thing to the
subject of quasi contracts so that the promisee under those circumstances shall never
recover on the promise but he shall recover such an amount as will fairly compensate him
for any injury incurred; but it seems to me you have to take one leg or the other. You
have either to say the promise is binding or you have to go on the theory of restoring the
status quo." Id. at 103-104.
Cf., "A promise of one thousand dollars with which to buy a motor car may thus be
binding if it induces the purchase of the car." 1 WILUsToN, CONRAC'rS (2d ed. 1936)
§ 140.
On the other hand, Professor Gardner seems to assume that in cases coming under §90
the promisee should be merely "indemnified for loss suffei'ed in reliance" on the promise.
He regards the "assumption that a suit for breach of promise must necessarily be a suit
to recover the value of the asserted power" as "both analytically and historically incorrect."
Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts (1932) 46 HARv. L. Rzv.
1, 23.
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proving reliance can scarcely be applicable to a situation where we actually
insist on proof of reliance, and indeed, reliance of a "definite and substan-
tial character." The notion that the expectancy is granted as compensation
for foregoing the opportunity to enter other similar contracts is also
without application in this situation, if for no other reason than because
no contract is here "entered" at all. Finally the policy in favor of facili-
tating reliance can scarcely be extended to all promises indiscriminately.
Any such policy must presuppose that reliance in the particular situation
will normally have some general utility. Where we are dealing with
"exchanges" or "bargains" it is easy to discern this utility since such
transactions form the very mechanism by which production is organized
in a capitalistic society. There seems no basis for assuming any such
general utility in the promises coming under § 90, since they are restricted
only by a negative definition-they are not bargains.
Is the application of the "normal" rule of damages to non-bargain
promises then an unanswerable refutation of the explanation which we
have attempted of the rule? We think not. In the first place, it is
obviously possible that courts have, through force of habit, given a
broader application to the rule than a philosophic inquiry into its pos-
sible bases would justify. In the second place, it is by no means clear,
from the decisions at any rate, that the rule of recovery in the case of
these "non-bargain" promises is necessarily that which measures damages
by the expectancy. There are, as we shall show in our second install-
ment, cases which indicate the contrary.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that the judicial treatment accorded
contracts is affected by the relation between the particular contract and
what we have called "the credit system." The ideal contract from the
standpoint of the credit system is the (bargain) promise to pay money.
Here we find a combination of legal qualities which reflects the intimate
association of this type of contract with the economic institution of
credit: free alienation by the creditor; free substitution of another's
performance by the debtor; easy convertibility between present and future
claims, the difference being measured by interest; damages measured by
a mechanical standard which excludes consideration of the peculiarities
of the particular situation; finally, damages measured by the expectancy,
with no tendency to substitute a different measure.
If it were not for certain complicating cross currents we might expect
to find a uniform increase in the tendency to remit the plaintiff to the
reliance interest as we progress away from the credit system. This would
come about in two ways, both of which may be illustrated in the contract
to adopt." (1) The farther removed a contract is from the credit sys-
15. See Sandham v. Grounds, 94 Fed. 83 (C. C. A. 3d, 1899) holding that recovery
for breach of contract to adopt is limited to the reliance interest. In (1899) 13 HAnv.
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tem the more difficult it is to measure the value of the expectancy. (2)
The farther removed a contract is from the credit system, the less is
the judicial incentive to grant the expectancy, the less pressing are the
basic policies which justify the granting of the expectancy in the or-
dinary business agreement.
We have referred to complicating factors which prevent a steady in-
crease in the tendency to depart from the rule granting the expectancy
as we progress away from the credit system. The chief of these Iies" in
the fact that courts have a natural preference for the rule of recovery
which offers the most easily administered standard. This factor has a
peculiar relevance to promises coming under § 90 of the Restatement,
where the expectancy is generally a definite sum of money., An attempt
to trace the influence of this factor will be undertaken in the next
section.
THE DIVERGENCE OF MEASURE AND MOTIVE AND THE PROBLEM
OF MIXED MOTIVES
We have already intimated the nature of the principal difficulty which
is encountered in any analysis of the purposes of contract law. This
difficulty consists in the fact that it is impossible to assume that when
a court enforces a promise it necessarily pursues only one purpose and
protects one "interest", or that the purpose or interest which forms the
rationale of the court's action necessarily furnishes the measure of the
promisce's recovery."6 In actuality not only may a court consider itself
in a given case as vindicating more than one of the three contract "in-
terests" we have distinguished, but even where it is reasonable to suppose
L. Rrv. 223, the rule there laid down is regarded a; desirable "although contrary to the
theory of damages."
It may at first seem puzzling that there should be a considerable number of cases grant-
ing "specific performance" of contracts to adopt. (The cases will be found collected in
1 C. J. 1379). An examination of these cases will reveal, however, that they are mostly,
if not entirely, cases where two factors are present: (1) the foster parent is dead; (2)
the plaintiff had done everything necessary to perfect his rights under the agreement be-
fore the death of the promisor. In such a situation the granting of the expectancy can
be explained on two grounds: (1) the expectation interest has ceased entirely to be con-
jectural, being now merely a statutory share in the estate, and (2) granting "specific
performance'"-that is, assigning to the plaintiff a child's share in the estate--is the most
natural and most certain method of reimbursing the plaintiff's reliance, or, as is usually the
case, of accomplishing a restitution of values received by the deceased promisor. Neither
of these considerations applies, however, where the promisor is still alive, or where, as was
apparently the case in Sandham v. Grounds, supra, there was a repudiation of the con-
tract by the foster parent before the child had performed his side of the agreement.
16. A failure to take into account what may be called motivational cross-currents seems
to constitute the principal defect of Professor Cohen's valuable article, The Basis of
Contract (1933) 46 H~Av. L. REv. 553.
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that a single interest furnishes the exclusive raison d'ttre of legal inter-
vention it is still possible that for reasons of convenience and certainty
the court may choose a measure of recovery which differs from that
suggested by the interest protected.
A difficulty in identifying the "ultimate" motives for enforcing con-
tracts exists even as to the earliest stages of legal history. Without at-
tempting to review here what is known concerning the early history of
contract, it may safely be said that in England,"7 in Rome,"' and
perhaps generally in primitive law, 9 a place of favor was accorded what
may be called the real contract, the "delivery-promise," ' or the half-
completed exchange. In reliance on a promise by the defendant to pay
a named price the plaintiff confers some benefit on the defendant; the
defendant fails to pay, and the plaintiff brings suit for the agreed price.
This is, in outline form, the real contract. Not only was this the situa-
tion where in the absence of formalities courts were most willing to
intervene, but it is probable that some such transaction originally fur-
nished an indispensable factual core for most formal contracts."'
So long as the law confines its intervention to this situation (or to
the extent that it grants certain remedies only in this situation) it would
seem that the fundamental purpose of the law is the prevention of unjust
enrichment, since enrichment of the promisor at the expense of the
promisee is the sine qua non of judicial interference. Yet though the
prevention of unjust enrichment may seem to supply the underlying
rationale of legal intervention in the case of the real contract, the measure
of recovery was, as we know, from the very beginning the promised
price, the expectancy. Various explanations may be given for this ap-
parent discrepancy between the conditions under which liability was
imposed and the terms of the liability itself. Even if it were granted
17. PLUCKN'ET, A CoNcIsE HISTORY OF THE Comin.o LAw (1929) 401.
18. RAnn, RomAN LAw (1927) §60. The precise order in which the various types of
informal contracts became enforceable in Rome seems to be a matter of doubt. GMAno,
MANUEL P.LEMENTAIRE DE DROIT Rom N (8th ed. 1929) 467. Of course both in England
and in Rome there was a gradual expansion of the relief granted, so that in time a direct
benefit to the promisor ceased to be essential.
19. DiA oND, ParrnTv LAw (1935) 391-445. Speaking of Babylonian and Assyrian
law he writes, "There are no transactions which are made binding by the mere fact of
agreement without the transfer of property. That type of commercial transaction has not
yet been reached; law compensates for loss, and until there are middlemen, and marl:et
prices that fluctuate from day to day, there will be no purely executory agreement to
purchase and sell on a future date, nor can there be pecuniary loss by failure to perform
such an agreement." Id. at 409.
20. Henry, Consideration in Contracts (1917) 26 YALE L J. 664, 678.
21. As in the Roman nexum (assuming that that transaction was once used to create
obligations), and perhaps in the sealed contract in England. 2 PoLuocz AD MAITLA,D.
HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1898) 213.
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that the sole purpose pursued by the courts was the prevention of unjust
enrichment it would be possible to regard the promised price as the most
obvious and most simple method of measuring the extent of that en-
richment, particularly in an age which veered away from any kind of
legal relief which involved estimation. If this is the proper explanation
for the measure of damages in real contracts we have in them an illus-
tration of the divergence of measure and motive; or, to speak with less
attempt at epigram, a case where though the fundamental motive %was
prevention of unjust enrichment the court was moved to substitute for
the measure which that purpose would normally dictate a simpler and
more easily administered measure.22
A quite different and perhaps more accurate explanation can, however,
be given for the measure of recovery applied to real contracts. It may
be said that the element of unjust enrichment present in those cases
served to unlock, as it were, the latent impulse to hold men to their bar-
gains. The courts would have preferred to see men perform their agree-
ments in all cases. But where the promisee had as yet given nothing
for the promise there was a hesitancy about legal intervention- (and no
doubt also about moral condemnation), which only the combination of
unjust impoverishment and unjust gain that the real contract presents
sufficed to overcome. Viewed in this way the measure of recovery ap-
plied to real contracts was not so much a case of the divergence of measure
and motive as a case of mixed motives.
The ambiguity concerning ultimate motives and concerning the con-
gruity of measure and motive which haunts the earliest period of legal
history casts a shadow over all its later developments. Thus in the early
stages of its growth the action of assumpsit was clearly dominated by
the reliance interest, so much so that Ames assumed, even in the absence
of cases in point, that recovery in assumpsit must originally have been
limited to compensation for change of position.23 But if this was in fact
the original rule it was not in any event long before damages were
measured by the expectation interest. So long, however, as it was only
the relied-on promise which was enforced by the action of assumpsit,
22. McCormick discerns as one of the advantages of the rule measuring damages in
deceit by the expectation interest, that it generally offers, in comparison with the rule
measuring damages by the reliance interest, "a simple standard, reasonably definite and
easily understood." McCoRMicK, DAMAGES (1935) 453.
23. To be sure Ames spoke in terms of "reimbursement for the loss of the thing given
for the promise" which sounds more like a description of restitution than compensation for
injurious reliance. AMES, LEcTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY (1913) 144. But since there is
nothing in the history of assumpsit to suggest that the remedy would ever have been
restricted to the recovery of a benefit conferred, it is safe to assume that Ames' language
was due to the not uncommon though careless identification of reimbursement for change
of position with restitution.
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we have the same problem here that we had in the case of the real
contract. Was the expectation interest taken as the measure of recovery
because it offered a more certain standard than the reliance interest, or
because the factor of reliance served to unlock the impulse to compel
men to make good their promises? It is, of course, impossible to give
any conclusive answer to this question.
In modem law the problem of mixed motives and the divergence of
measure and motive, though present everywhere, is most acute in what
may be called "non-bargain" promises. In the case of those contracts
which perform a function in "the. credit system," which, in other words,
have more or less directly to do with the mechanism which in a capital-
istic society provides an organization for the production, exchange, and
distribution of goods, the expectation interest tends to become dominant.
But when we go outside the realm of "bargains," as for example in
the promises coming under § 90 of the Contracts Restatement, we find
that reliance reassumes an important role. A promise which invites, but
does not request as its "price," some reliance by the promisee becomes
enforceable only when relied on. If reliance is here the s'ne qua sion of
legal intervention, then protection of the reliance interest is obviously
a part of the motive actuating courts in such cases. Is it the whole
motive? Does reliance here also furnish the measure of recovery? To
these questions, vital as they are, the decisions afford us no clear cut
answer. As has already been recalled, Williston assumes that the measure
of recovery for these "non-bargain" promises is the same as for
"bargains," namely, the expectancy.24 Assuming that this is a correct
statement of the law (and there are many cases to support it as well as
some to refute it) how are we to explain the discrepancy between what
appears as the fundamental motive (compensation for detrimental reli-
ance) and the measure of recovery, which disregards reliance? As in
the case of the real contract and the action of assum~sit in its early
stages, two principal explanations are conceivable. If we leave out of
account the possibility that courts have here granted the expectancy merely
from habit, then either the expectation interest is preferred as a measure
of recovery because of its greater definiteness ("divergence of measure
and motive") or the factor of reliance serves to release the impulse to
compel men to make good their promises ("mixed motives"). Of course
there is no method of demonstrating which of these is the "true" ex-
planation. Yet by leaving the matter of the controlling motive in this
ambiguous state, we leave unsettled questions of very considerable prac-
tical importance. For example, if in cases coming under § 90 the ex-
pectation interest is preferred as a measure of recovery merely for its
24. See note 14 supra.
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certainty, then we might expect to see substituted for it the reliance
interest in every case in which that interest happened to offer a relatively
certain standard for computing damages. On the other hand, if reliance
merely serves as a kind of catalytic agent to stimulate the impulse to hold
men to their promises, the question whether the reliance interest offered
a practicable measure of recovery would be irrelevant, and the expecta-
tion interest would in any event be adopted as the measure of recovery.
The same difficulty in assigning to the expectation and reliance in-
terests their respective roles which arises in contracts coming under
§ 90 arises generally in "informal" and "non-commercial" contracts
(including the many cases classified under such headings as "waiver"
and "estoppel") and in all situations where reliance by the promisee
is an indispensable condition to judicial interference. A more detailed
study of cases of this type must be postponed to our second installment.
We are accustomed to think of these non-bargain promises, where
the promisee must show reliance in order to recover, as anomalous, as
not quite contracts in the full sense of the term. It is worthy of obser-
vation, since it will show how subject to manipulation our "fundamental
principles" ar6, that it would be quite possible to reverse our concep-
tions in this connection of what is normal and what is anomalous, with-
out doing any violence to the rules which ultimately determine what
contracts are to be enforced. We might easily base the whole law of
contracts on a fundamental premise that only those promises which have
been relied on will be enforced. As the chief exception to this principle
we should have to list the bilateral business agreement. 5 The rationale
for this exception could be found in the fact that in such agreements
reliance is extremely likely to occur and extremely difficult to prove. Jur-
istic tact might even suggest conferring on the exception the disguising
vesture of a conclusive presumption. "In the case of bilateral business
agreements we do not dispense with proof of reliance but instead con-
clusively presume that reliance has taken place and that the expectancy is
the proper measure of the extent of the reliance." Such a presumption
would certainly dc no more violence to the facts than most conclusive pre-
sumptions. It is not at all clear that such a rationalization of contract law
25. This is in fact the approach taken in HARRIMAN, CONTRAcTS (2d ed. 1901) § 133.
. . . With the exceptions hereafter to be noted, the consideration must be an act done
in reliance on the promise." § 135 . . . "Where a contract consists of mutual promises,
each of the promises is the consideration for the other. To say that each promise is given
in reliance upon the other would not seem to be stretching legal theory too far; yet it
may seem simpler to some to regard the case of mutual promises as an exception to the
general rule."
Cf. ". . . It may fairly be argued that the fundamental basis of simple contracts his-
torically was action in justifiable reliance on a promise . . ." 1 WILISTON, CONTRACTS
(2d ed. 1936) §139.
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in terms of reliance might not have advantages over the more customary
modes of thought which tend to relegate the reliance interest to the field
of not-quite contract law.
With this preliminary survey of the three contract interests, we are
now ready to turn our attention more directly to the interest which is
the chief subject of this inquiry, the reliance interest.
THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RELIANCE INTEREST AND THE
OTHER CONTRACT INTERESTS
The abstract definitions which we have given of the three contract
"'interests" would seem on casual reading to be mutually exclusive. Yet
here as everywhere in the law we are plagued by the borderline cases.
Not only does there exist, as we have shown in our last section, an am-
biguity concerning these interests from a psychological or motivational
point of view, so that it is difficult to tell which of them a court is "really"
seeking to vindicate, but there is also an ambiguity in them even from
an analytical or definitional point of view.
The reliance interest is, as we have already pointed out, generally
broad enough to cover all of the cases coming under the restitution
interest."8 It is also broad enough to embrace some cases not covered
by that interest. The problem of the relation between these tao inter-
ests hinges, therefore, chiefly on the problem of defining this surplus
area of the reliance interest. Since this area consists of the cases in
which the promisee has detrimentally ielied on a promise without thereby
benefiting the promisor, it is obvious that the extent of this area will
depend upon the scope given the concept "benefit." If we define benefit
narrowly by insisting on an "actual" increase in the promisor's "assets"
then the field of cases covered by the reliance interest but excluded from
the restitution interest -will be relatively large. Thus if A were hired
by B to cast spells, we might, assuming A devoted himself assiduously
to his task, be able to find detrimental reliance by A without any cor-
responding "benefit" to B. At the other extreme lies a conception which
would view as a "benefit" anything for which the promisor bargained
and was willing to pay a price.2  If this conception of "benefit" were
accepted in its extreme form only a relatively narrow field would be
left for the reliance interest. Any bargained-for reliance would auto-
matically fall within the restitution interest. Excluded from the resti-
tution interest we should find only two kinds of reliance: (1) reliance
26. But see the qualifications made mpra at p. 54. and in note 2 mpra.
27. The CoNTRAcrs RESTATEMENT goes almost this far, but adds the qualification that
the performance must have been "received" by the defendant. RESTATE?'AzN, Co=mAcTs
(1932) § 348. The term "received" is, however, given a very broad definition. See
comment a to § 348.
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on promises which are not bargains (as under § 90 of the Contracts
Restatement), and (2) unbargained-for reliance on bargain promises
(reliance "outside the contract," as for example in "passing up" other
offers). The field occupied by these two types of reliance would, so
far as legal effect is concerned, be even further narrowed by the appli-
cation of such notions as "causality" and "foreseeability." Hence it is
clear that any conception which made "benefit" equivalent to "bargained-
for act" would leave only an extremely limited field as the exclusive
hegemony of the reliance interest.
The inescapable flexibility of the concept "benefit" means that draw-
ing the line between the reliance and restitution interests is in the end
a rather arbitrary affair. By substituting for "benefit" a. stricter term
like "enrichment" we shift the line in one direction; by substituting a
looser term like "performance received by the promisor" we shift it
in the other. In view of the fact that the line is set ultimately by a kind
of definitional fiat it is remarkable that it should have become customary
to think of restitution as a remedy entirely distinct from the usual suit
on a contract. Where "the contract" is regarded as furnishing a kind
of conduit for'the ordinary suit, it becomes an obstruction in the way,
of restitution and must be removed by "rescission." That in this legal
hydromechanics sight should be lost of the purposes underlying the
remedies involved can occasion no wonder.
The conception (or perhaps we should say "visualization") of resti-
tution as something entirely different from a suit "on the contract" has
had a number of unfortunate consequences. Among them we may list:
(1) the importation into the problem of the notion of "election" (the
plaintiff has to choose in advance along what route his action will run)
with the consequence that restitution and an action "on the contract,"
cannot be, except provisionally, combined in one suit ;28 (2) the require-
ment that the plaintiff must as a condition precedent to suit for restitu-
tion return any benefits received,29 and (3) must in an" event first
give notice of his intention to remove the obstacle of the contract."
In certain cases it is possible for the plaintiff to avoid the inconveni-
28. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) §266; 3 WLLSTON, CONTRACrS (1920)
§1469. The doctrine of election is reduced to its most innocuous terms in RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRAcrs (1932) §381. However, even under the Restatement it remains impossible,
apparently, to combine restitution and a suit for "damages" in one action.
29. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §349; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913)
§265; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (1920) §1460.
30. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS (1913) §267. In listing these restrictions on resti-
tution as unfortunate consequences of the notion that restitution is founded on a destruc-
tion of the contract we do not mean to imply that they are all settled law. The last re-
quirement mentioned is particularly of doubtful standing, as Woodward points out in the
section cited.
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ences and hazards involved in restitution by bringing a suit for the
value of his "expenditures in performance," a suit which protects the
reliance interest (and therefore by necessary implication, the restitu-
tion interest) but which has been regarded as a suit "on the contract." 3'
In one aspect it is perhaps fortunate that the reliance interest, though
extensively recognized in our law, has received its recognition in a covert
-one is tempted to say, clandestine-fashion. Had it been openly labelled
as a distinct basis of suit it is quite probable that the courts would have
compelled the plaintiff suing on a contract to "elect" between the reliance
and the expectation interests. Fortunately, there seems to be no sug-
gestion in the cases of the necessity for such an election, and the suit
which seeks reimbursement for reliance has accordingly remained free
from the pitfalls which surround the action for restitution.2
In distinguishing between the reliance and the expectation interests
we encounter not so much a shifting line of division as a miscellaneous
group of cases which seem equally happy in either category. These two
interests will furnish identical, or nearly identical, measures of recovery
in at least three kinds of cases.
First, where the plaintiff's reliance takes the form of acts essential
to the enforcement of the contract by him (such as partial performance
of the contract or necessary preparations to perform) and the defendant
breaks or repudiates the contract before complete performance has taken
place, it is possible to classify the plaintiff's suit as resting either on the
31. 3 N.Vusox, ColAcrs (1920) §1341; cf. REsTATEumnT, Co.vrAcrs (1932)
§333.
32. In Rabinowitz v. Marcus, 100 Conn. 86, 123 AtL 21 (1923), however, the ap-
parently unique view was taken that a .suit to obtain reimbursement for reliance (an
important portion of which did not benefit the defendant) was based on a rescission of
the contract. There is even language in the decision which might be construed as im-
-o1ying that there must be an election between a suit for "damages" and a suit to obtain
reimbursement for expenses incurred.
Attention should also be called to those cases where the plaintiff has relied on a contract
within the Statute of Frauds, and where the courts have felt constrained (in order to
avoid the appearance of permitting a suit "on the contract") to treat the claim to reim-
bursement for reliance as a suit for restitution. That in these cases items of reliance are
often compensated which are not properly regarded as covered by even the most generous
definition of restitution will be shovm in our second installment. Where, as in cases of
this sort, a suit to obtain reimbursement for reliance has to be disguised as a suit for
restitution, it is obvious that there is a danger that the disguise may be taken seriously,
and that the suit will be subjected to all the limitations imposed on a "real" suit for
restitution.
There may be a hint of the notion of an election between the reliance and e%-ectation
irterests in the occasional statements that the plaintiff cannot recover reimbursement for
h-s part performance and the lost profit in one suit. See note 44 infra. The ostensible
ground for this view is, however, that allowing both of these items would result in
"*double recovery".
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expectation interest alone, or on a combination of the expectation and
reliance interests. If a building contractor has finished half the struc-
ture when the property owner puts an end to the contract the contractor's
declaration may list two items of damage: (1) expenditures actually
made in performing or preparing to perform, and (2) the profit which
he would have made on the whole contract. This looks like a combina-
tion of the reliance and the expectation interests, and it will necessarily
be so analyzed if we restrict the scope of the expectation interest' to
what may be called the net expectancy, in other words, if we make "the
expectation interest" and "the lost profit" synonymous. But in cases
where the plaintiff has undertaken performance or preparations to per-
form a profitable contract before the defendant's breach it involves no
distortion to say that the plaintiff's expectancy is really twofold and
includes (1) reimbursement for what has been done, and (2) a profit
in addition. This broader expectancy we may call the gross expectation
interest. Using this broader concept the contractor's suit in the case
supposed will appear to be founded entirely on the expectation interest. 83
The possibility of subsuming a recovery for the value of part perform-
ance under the expectation interest is indicated by the fact that it is
possible to state, entirely in terms of the expectancy, measures of re-
covery which would, if all the relevant data were available, yield the
same sum as the formula measuring recovery by the reasonable value
of what has been done plus the profit. Examples of such measures would
be: (a) payment for work done at the contract rate, plus the profit
lost on the unperformed portion of the contract, (b) the full contract
price less the cost of completion.
Secondly, where the reliance interest is conceived to embrace the loss
of the opportunity to enter similar contracts with other persons, the
reliance and expectation interests will have a tendency to approach one
another, the precise degree of their correspondence depending upon the
extent to which other opportunities of a similar nature were open to
the plaintiff when he entered the contract on which suit is brought. The
physician who by making one appointment deprives himself of the op-
portunity of making a precisely similar appointment with another patient
presents a case of a complete correspondence between the reliance and
expectation interests. The tendency of the expectation and reliance
interests to coalesce in cases of this sort has the consequence that the
same item of damages may often be classified under either heading.
Thus where the defendant's breach of contract results in the plaintiff's
property remaining idle for a period, the courts in awarding the plaintiff
the rental value of the premises have sometimes considered that they
33. It is so analysed in RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 333, comment a.
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were granting reimbursement for the loss of the opportunity to employ
the property for other purposes (the reliance interest), U and sometimes
that they were granting compensation for the loss of the profits which
would have been made had the defendant performed his promise (ex-
pectation interest) .
Thirdly, the reliance and the expectation interests will coincide in
those cases where the breach of a contract results not simply in the
loss of the promised value but in some direct harm. A farmer buys a
cow warranted to be free from disease. The cow is in fact diseased
and contaminates the purchaser's whole herd. So far as the item of
direct loss is concerned (the contamination of the herd) it is not pos-
sible to draw a distinction between the reliance and the expectation
interests. This loss would not have occurred either if the defendant had
not broken his contract, or if the plaintiff had not entered and relied
on the contract.
SHOULD THE EXPECTATION INTEREST SET THE LIMIT OF RECoVERY?
In the contracts upon which suit is brought the value of the expect-
ancy ordinarily exceeds the reliance interest. It is possible, however,
that the reliance interest may offer the plaintiff a more generous measure
of recovery than the expectation interest. In such cases should the value
of the expectancy be regarded as setting a limit on recovery? The
sections of the German Civil Code which accord protection to the re-
liance interest provide that the recovery shall in no event exceed the
expectation interest." The covert treatment accorded the reliance in-
terest in our law makes it impossible to expect so explicit and general
an-answer to the problem as it arises in the common law. There are
not lacking, however, intimations of a view similar to that taken in
the German Code." Is there any basis for this notion that recovery
based on reliance should never be allowed to exceed the value of the
expectancy?
Before attempting an answer it should be noted that there are at
least two ambiguities in our question, both of which have to do with
34. This was apparently the way the matter was viewed in Paola Gas Co. v. Paola
Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621 (1896).
35. As in Griffin v. Colver, 16 N. Y. 489 (1858).
36. §§122, 179, 307. The language of the limitation is in each section substantially
the same, " . . . jedoch nicht fiber den Betrag des Interesses hinaus, xelches der andere
Tell an der Giiltigkeit [or "Wirksamkeit"] des Vertrags hat."
37. See RESTATEmE.T, CoNTRACrs (1932) §333 (a) ("such expenditures are not
recoverable in excess of the full contract price"); Gardner, An Inquiry into the Prin-
ciples of the Law of Contracts (1932) 46 HAnV. L. REv. 1, 22 ("not exceeding the value
of the power asserted"); Glaspie v. Glassow, 28 Minn. 158, 9 N. NV. 669 (1831).
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the meaning of the expression "value of the expectancy." In the first
place does this term refer to the "net expectation interest" ("the lost
profit") or to the "gross expectation interest," the expectancy in the
case of full performance? The answer is pretty clearly that it is the
latter which is meant, since a limitation on recovery in terms of the
"net expectation interest" would be absurd."8 That a building contractor
stood to make only $200 on his contract as a whole should not prevent
him from recovering, let us say, $5,000 as reimbursement for expendi-
tures made before the defendant's breach. The second ambiguity is less
easy to deal with. Is the value of the expectancy to be measured "ob-
jectively," according to its market price or "reasonable value," or is it
to be measured in terms of its utility to the plaintiff in his particular
situation? The importance to the promisee of a promise to deliver a
piece of machinery "reasonably worth" $100 may vastly transcend this
"objective" value. With this piece of machinery, the plaintiff may be
able to operate his factory at a profit of thousands of dollars; without
it, he may suffer heavy losses. Let us for the time being assume-as
the language usually employed in formulating the limitation.("the full
contract price") justifies us in assuming-that the "value of the expect-
ancy" is to be measured "objectively," and discover what justification
there may be for a rule which declares that recovery for reliance on a
contract should never be permitted to exceed the "objective" value of
the expectancy.
To pass on this question it is necessary to inquire what things may
bring it about that the reliance interest exceeds the "reasonable value"
of the defendant's promised performance. The most obvious possibility
is that the plaintiff has entered a losing contract. A manufacturer has
undertaken to construct a machine for $1,000 failing to foresee that
it will be necessary at a cost of $1,500 to tear down and replace a wall
of his plant in order to remove the machine when it is completed. If
the manufacturer here should seek to recover the full reliance interest
($1,500 plus the cost of materials and labor on the machine) the obvious
objection might seem to be that he is trying to shift the burden of his
own improvidence to the other party. In answer it may be pointed out
that he will have no opportunity to do this unless the other party has,
first been guilty of a breach of contract. If the buyer promptly pays
the $1,000 agreed upon as the purchase price no suit by the manufac-
turer will be possible; if the manufacturer is going to be able to sue
at all, it will be because the purchaser is in default. The question then
really becomes, should default by the defendant have the consequence
38. The limitation prescribed by Gardner (loc. cit. supra, note 37) seems to be
phrased in terms of the net expectation interest, though this was probably not intended.
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of entitling the plaintiff to shift to him the loss which he would have
suffered if the defendant had performed the contract? Is this a proper
penalty to impose for contract breach? Probably in most cases it would
not be so regarded. It should be noted, however, that in suits for resti-
tution there are many cases permitting the plaintiff to recover the value
of benefits conferred on the defendant, even though this value exceeds
that of the return performance promised by the defendant."  In these
cases it is no doubt felt that the defendant's breach should work a for-
feiture of his right to retain the benefits of an advantageous bargain.
It would be going but a step farther (particularly when it is recalled that
the "benefits" which the defendant "retains" in the restitution cases are
often little more than legal figments) to lay down a broad rule that breach
should deprive the defaulter of the power to limit the other party's re-,
covery for detrimental reliance. Again, in a suit for deceit, reimburse-
ment has been granted the plaintiff for his reliance though this exceeded
the actual value of the defendant's promised performance, in other
words, although the plaintiff would have had a poor bargain even if the
defendant's statements had been true.40 Cases of this sort can be
distinguished from the type of case we are discussing only on the some-
what indefinite ground that the policy in favor of discouraging deceit is
stronger than that in favor of discouraging breach of contract. By
invoking these comparisons with suits for deceit and restitution we do
not mean to suggest that the "full contract price" (that is, the "objective"
value of the expectancy) ought not to. limit recovery in the ordinary type
of case under discussion. We only suggest that it would perhaps be un-
wise to lay down a categorical rule about the matter, and that it is quite
possible in a case of a particularly inexcusable breach that the court might
feel it was not imposing too heavy a penalty on the defendant to shift
to him the loss which the plaintiff would have incurred even if the defend-
ant had performed his contract.
But does an excess of the reliance over the expectation interest neces-
sarily imply that the plaintiff has entered a losing bargain? In the old
case of Nurse v. Barns41 the defendant "in consideration of 10£" prom-
ised to give the plaintiff the use of certain premises for a period of six
months. Relying on this promise the plaintiff laid in a stock of goods.
The defendant then failed to perform his promise. Because his expendi-
tures for goods were thus rendered vain the plaintiff lost £500, which
he was permitted to recover from the defendant. Here there was nothing
to indicate that the plaintiff entered a losing bargain; on the contrary
39. 3 WiLVo. , CoxRnActs (1920) § 1485; VOODwARD, QUASI CONTTAcrS (1913)
§268.
40. Wallace v. Hallowell, 56 Minn. 501, 58 N. IV. 292 (1894).
41. T. Rayn. 77 (1664).
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it was expressly found that the lease was worth just what the plaintiff
agreed to pay for it.
It is obvious that we need a distinction between two kinds of reliance.
Certain acts of reliance are in a loose sense the "price" of whatever
benefits the contract may involve for the plaintiff. This type of reliance
we shall call "essential reliance". Under this heading would be included
the performance of express and implied conditions in bilateral contracts,
the performance of the act requested by an offer for a unilateral con-
tract, preparations to perform in both of the cases just mentioned, and
the losses involved in entering the contract itself, as, for instance, in
foregoing the opportunity to enter other profitable contracts. As to this
kind of reliance ("essential reliance") if we do not limit recovery by
the "contract price" we are permitting the plaintiff to shift to the defend-
ant his own contractual losses, when the defendant is guilty of nothing
more reprehensible than breach of contract.
In contrast to "essential reliance" is the kind of reliance involved in
Nurse v. Barns, which we shall call "incidental reliance." The plaintiff's
reliance there (laying in a stock of goods) followed naturally, and, we
may assume, foreseeably, from the contract. It did not, however, con-
sist of acts necessary to the perfection of the plaintiff's rights on the
contract; it cannot be regarded as the "price" of the defendant's per-
formance. To shift the burden of such reliance to the defendant in an
amount exceeding "the full contract price" is not to shift to the defendant
the plaintiff's contractual losses. In such a case therefore there appears
no valid reason to limit the plaintiff's recovery by the expectation interest
measured "objectively." If there is to be any limit at all it must be
according to some standard more generous than the "contract price."
Should there be any limit on recovery in cases like Nurse v. Barns?
Suppose it had been shown in that case that the business contemplated
by the plaintiff would have been operated at a loss and that this loss
would have exceeded the amount which the plaintiff sought to recover
as reimbursement for his reliance. If the plaintiff is in such a situation
permitted to recover, it is obvious that we are in effect shifting to the
defendant the loss which the plaintiff would have incurred in the venture
undertaken in reliance on the contract. To prevent this we must limit
the plaintiff's recovery by the expectation interest measured "subjec-
tively," that is, with reference to the profit or loss reasonably to be an-
ticipated from the contemplated business.4 2 In practice this limitation
42. A suggestion of such a limitation is found in Crutcher & Co. v. Elliott, 13 Ky.
Law Rep. 592 (1892), where the court said, "While the plaintiff in this case sued for
and was allowed to recover the amount paid for the seed, the rental value of the land
on which it was sown, and the cost of preparing the land and sowing the seed, yet as
that, in the absence of any allegation by the defendant of special facts, is presumptively
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will be of slight significance since in cases like Nurse v. Barns it will
seldom be possible to judge with any accuracy what the fate of the
venture would have been had it not been interrupted by the defendant's
failure to perform his contract.
We may summarize the conclusions reached so far in the following
terms. A claim based upon "essential reliance" should normally be
limited by the expectation interest measured "objectively," because an
excess of the reliance interest over the reasonable value of the thing
promised by the defendant would indicate that the plaintiff had entered
a losing bargain. To permit a recovery beyond the "full contract price"
would be to permit the plaintiff to shift his contractual losses to the de-
fendant. Where "incidental reliance" is involved there is no reason to
limit recovery by "the full contract price," that is, the "objective" ex-
pectancy. On the other hand, the plaintiff should no more be permitted
to shift to the defendant the losses incurred in a venture undertaken in
reliance on the contract than he should be permitted to compel the defend-
ant to stand the loss he incurred in entering the contract itself. Accord-
ingly, in cases where reimbursement for "incidental reliance" is sought
recovery should be limited by the expectation interest measured "subjec-
tively." In practice this limitation will generally be too indefinite, how-
ever, to be of great significance. All of these points are contained by
implication in a very simple formula: We will not in a suit for rein-
bursement for losses hicurred in reliance on a contract knowingly put
the plaitiff in a better position than he would have occupied had the
contract been fully performed.
We have spoken so far only of a gross limitation on the plaintiff's
recovery. However, the proposition that we will avoid conferring on
the plaintiff advantages beyond those which performance of the contract
would have involved carries the further corollary that there should be
deducted from the plaintiff's recovery any losses he would have suffered
had the contract been performed. If a contractor sues for reimburse-
ment for $5,000 spent in partial performance of a contract on which
he would have lost $1,000 had he been permitted to complete it, probably
most courts would award the plaintiff only $4,000."1 In cases of inci-
dental reliance the deduction of prospective losses might conceivably be
twofold, and embrace both contractual losses (the plaintiff entered a
less than the value of the crop would have been if the seed had beets of the hind repre-
sented, the defendant is not prejudiced." (Italics supplied.) On the other hand, the fact
that the plaintiff would merely have "broken even" in the dependent venture offers no
reason for denying or reducing recovery for incidental reliance. Harrow Spring Co. v.
Whipple Harrow Co., 90 Mich. 147, 51 N. NV. 197 (1892).
43. RESTATESSENT, CONTR S (1932) §333 (d); Reynolds v. Levi, 122 Mich. 115,
80 N. WV. 999 (1899). On the other hand, the deduction would probably not be made
in a suit for restitution. Bush v. Canfield, 2 Conn. 485 (1818).
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bad bargain with the defendant) and the losses he would have suffered
in the dependent venture even if that venture had not been frustrated
by the defendant's breach.
The formula which directs us not to confer on the plaintiff seeking
reimbursement for reliance advantages more extensive than perform-
ance of the contract would have given him is useful as a generalization,
but only as a generalization. As we have already suggested it is quite
possible that this formula might in some cases be viewed as too strict
on the plaintiff. Where the breach of the defendant was of a type to
provoke indignation the court might shy away from the left-handed
enforcement of the contract for the benefit of a defaulter which this
formula seems to imply. On the other hand, the formula might in some
cases be rejected as too generous to the plaintiff. An example would
perhaps be a contract falling under § 90 of the Contracts Restatement.
An uncle promises his nephew $1,000 as a gift. The nephew decides to
go into business, and, reserving the promised sum for use in paying his
rent, spends a large sum of money laying in a stock of goods. The uncle
declines to perform his promise; the nephew is forced to abandon his
plans, and sells his stock of goods at a sacrifice of $2,000. There would
be no violation here of the suggested formula if we granted the nephew
$2,000, at least not if we assume that the nephew's venture would have
been successful. The case differs, however, from cases like Nurse v.
Barns in that the contract involved, if it is a "contract," is an. anomalous
one. Its enforcement even to the extent of the $1,000 promised is con-
ceived to involve a considerable stretching of legal doctrine. It may
therefore be felt that if recovery is here granted at all it should be limited
by the objective value of the uncle's promise. Some such rationale seems
to underlie the limitations in the sections of the German Civil Code al-
ready mentioned. These sections provide for a recovery of the reliance
interest in situations where, because of some hampering circumstance,
a perfect contract (which would yield the expectation interest) does not
result. Since the reliance interest is a kind of consolation for not getting
a perfect contract, it would be going beyond the underlying basis of
recovery to impose on the defendant a burden greater than performance
of the contract would have involved.
THE PROBLEM OF OVERLAPPING ITEMS OF DAMAGE
A near cousin to the problems just discussed is the question raised by
those cases in which elements of the reliance and expectation interests
are combined in one suit and it is contended that the plaintiff has listed
the same injury twice under different rubrics. In dealing with this prob-
lem of "double recovery" it is necessary to recur to the distinction already
taken between two kinds of reliance.
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So far as "essential reliance" is concerned the problem of double
recovery is controlled by the same principle that underlies the problems
discussed in the last section. This principle, somewhat vaguely stated, is
that a man cannot claim the benefits of a bargain without incurring its
detriments. Since "essential reliance" consists of those acts which must
occur before the plaintiff is entitled to the benefits of the contract and
is therefore in a sense the "price" of those benefits, it is improper for
the plaintiff to recover those benefits and at the same time shift the
cost of them to the defendant-unless of course breach of contract is
regarded as an offense serious enough to justify permitting a kind of
qui tarn action. If a plaintiff should perform his side of the contract
and then claim both compensation for the reliance involved in his per-
formance and at the same time the full value of the defendant's per-
formance, it would be obvious that he was asking too much. The case
would be the same if he performed half his contract and then, on re-
pudiation by the defendant, sought compensation at the contract rate
for what he had done and at the same time compensation for his partial
performance.
This principle against eating your cake and having it applies, however,
only to those cases where the plaintiff seeks what we have called the
"gross expectation interest." If a plaintiff seeks in one suit compensa-
tion for "essential reliance" and the lost profit ("the net expectation
interest") no double recovery will be involved if both items are allowed. 4
Here the plaintiff has, to be sure, eaten his cake, but he asks only for
the icing which was denied him. Less metaphorically, the reason why
there is not here any double recovery lies in the fact that the lost profit
is based on a deduction of the plaintiff's past or prospective "essential
reliance" (or his actual reliance in performing the contract if this has
exceeded "essential reliance") from the value of the performance prom-
ised by the defendant. Whatever is added under the heading "essential
reliance" should serve to reduce pro tanto the residuum which is the
lost profit. Hence if the lost profit is correctly calculated there is no
danger of double recovery in a suit which combines a claim for essential
reliance and for the lost profit." (An exception would exist if the
44. REsTATE MET, CoNTRACrS (1932) §333, comment c, and illustration 1;
McCoRmick, DAMAGES (1935) §142; see United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 333, 345
(1883). There are a surprisingly large number of cases in 'which a contrary opinion is
intimated. Worthington v. Given, 119 Ala. 44, 24 So. 739 (1893) ; Fontaine v. Ba.dey,
90 Ga. 416, 17 S. E. 1015 (1892); Noble v. Ames Mfg. Co., 112 Mass. 492 (1873);
Mount Pleasant Stable Co. v. Steinberg, 238 Mass. 567, 131 N. E. 295 (1921); Irwin
v. Vorcester Paper Box Co., 246 Mass. 453, 141 N. F_. 286 (1923); Otis v. Koontz,
70 Mo. 183 (1879); Holt v. United States Security Life Ins. Co., 76 N. J. Law 535,
72 AUt. 301 (1909).
45. The qualification, "if the lost profit is correctly computed," serves to explain the
judicial statements, referred to in the last note, to the effect that a claim for expendi-
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plaintiff were to ask compensation for his reliance in foregoing the
opportunity to enter other profitable contracts. This is properly "essen-
tial reliance" and should be so considered, for example, in connection
with the rule limiting recovery by the full contract price. But, assuming
that such a loss is compensable, it cannot be combined with a claim for
"the lost profit" because, unlike other forms of essential reliance, this
type of reliance is not deducted in calculating the amount of "the lost
profit.")
At first glance there would seem to be no problem of double recovery
in connection with "incidental reliance." Because "incidental reliance"
takes place, as it were, "outside the contract" it might appear that there
could be no duplication between the items comprehended under it and
those comprehended under the expectation interest. But this would be to
overlook the fact that while incidental reliance is ex vi termini not essen-
tial to the plaintiff's right to enforce the contract, it may be essential
to a concrete realization of the values assumed in measuring the ex-
pectation interest. The defendant breaks a contract to supply a feature
film to the plaintiff, the proprietor of a motion picture theater. The
plaintiff brings suit seeking to recover compensation for (1) the dif-
ference between the gross income actually derived from a substitute
picture and that which would have been derived from the promised film,
and (2) reimbursement for sums spent in advertising the promised
film.46 Here the reliance in spending money for advertising was not
"essential reliance"; the plaintiff could have held the defendant to the
contract without spending a cent for that purpose. Advertising was not
therefore the "price" of the defendant's performance. Yet it was the
"price" of the particular value which the plaintiff seeks to attribute to
that performance. Had the defendant performed his contract the adver-
tising expense would have been deducted from the plaintiff's gross in-
come from the picture; it would therefore be improper to permit the
tures in performance is incompatible with a claim for the lost profit. There is reason
to suppose that in each of the cases there cited the lost profit was being computed
according to a method which did not involve the deduction of the particular expenditure
for which the plaintiff was seeking reimbursement. Thus in Noble v. Ames Mfg. Co.,
112 Mass. 492 (1873), the plaintiff made an expensive trip in order to undertake his
duties under a one year contract of employment. He sought both reimbursement for
his travelling expenses and compensation for the lost salary. In denying the claim for
reimbursement for travelling expenses, the court overlooked the possibility of computing
the lost profit by deducting these expenses from the year's salary, and assumed that the
lost profit must consist of the promised salary less only what the plaintiff could earn
elsewhere after employment was refused him. That the problem of overlapping in these
cases hinges ultimately on the method by which the lost profit is computed is recognized
in American-Hungarian Pub. Co. v. Miles Bros., 68 Misc. Rep. 334, 123 N. Y. Supp.
879 (App. Term 1910).
46. Vitagraph-Lubin-Selig-Essanay v. Billings, 87 Okla. 192, 209 Pac. 773 (1922).
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plaintiff to recover the difference in gross income and the advertising
expense at the same time.
The overlapping involved in the case just discussed is fairly obvious
because the value of the defendant's performance was measured with
special reference to the plaintiff's situation; damages were "special"
rather than "general" and we can observe what factors were taken into
account in determining them. But where damages are "general" (the
difference between the market price or "the reasonable value" and the
contract price) the problem of overlapping becomes much more perplex-
ing. The difficulty here arises because the figure which represents the
market price or "the reasonable value" is not specially computed by the
court but represents a datum accepted from extracurial sources. It is
therefore impossible to know precisely what factors entered into its
determination. Justice Holmes once expressed the view that the vendee
under a contract for the sale of oil could not recover the difference be-
tween the market price (f.o.b. buyer's tank at seller's mill) and the
contract price, and at the same time reimbursement for expenses incurred
in arranging for shipment of the oil. "If it [the plaintiff corporation]
had received the oil, these were deductions from any profit which the
plaintiff would have made. But, if it gets the difference between the
contract price and the market price, it gets what represents the value of
the oil in its hands, and to allow these items in addition would be making
the defendant pay twice for the same thing."4 To be compared with
this holding are a number of cases granting the lessee who was denied
possession of the premises both reimbursement for moving expenses paid
out before the defendant's breach, and the difference between the "rea-
sonable value" of the lease and the rent reserved in the contract43 There
seems little to distinguish these cases from that discussed by Justice
Holmes, unless it be that a court or jury can in cases involving "reason-
able value" avoid overlapping by an adjustment (perhaps intuitive) in
the estimation of "reasonable value," an adjustment which would be
impossible in the case of a market price.
The most perplexing problem of all is perhaps that presented by the
combination of an expectancy measured by the market price or "reason-
able value," and a claim for advertising disbursements. The defendant
breaks a contract to assign a patent. The plaintiff sues, asking (1) the
difference between the "reasonable value" of the patent and the contract
price, and (2) reimbursement for sums spent in advertising articles which
were to have been manufactured under the patent. In passing on the
problem of overlapping we should have to consider the following ques-
47. Globe Refining Co. v. Landa Cotton Oil Co., 190 U. S. 540, 546 (1903).
48. Koneman v. Seymour, 176 Il1. App. 629 (1913); Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend.
71 (N. Y. 1837); Giles v. O'Toole, 4 Barb. 261 (N. Y. 1848).
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tions: (1) To what extent had the advertising already reflected itself
in an increased "reasonable value"? To this extent there would be over-
lapping. (2) Assuming that the advertising had not yet had its full
effect, or that it was spent in such a way as not to affect the value of
the patent itself, to what extent was allowance made for expenses of
this sort in the computation of the "reasonable value" of the patent?
To this extent, again, there is overlapping. (3) Assuming again that
the advertising has not operated to increase the "reasonable value" of
the patent, to what extent can the advertising be regarded as an inde-
pendent productive factor paying for itself and producing its own return?
To this extent there would be no overlapping, since the expenditure for
advertising is in this aspect a separate economic venture occasioned
by the contract, and not simply a price paid to "get at" a value contained
in the contract. This last question involves a problem of the type which
economists deal with under the heading of "imputational economics,"
though the conditions for an effective application of their methods will
scarcely be present in the cases likely to be litigated.49
These illustrations should be enough to suggest the difficulties involved
in the probleni of "double recovery," difficulties which we make no pre-
tense of having solved here. At the most our contribution has been to
localize the sources of trouble and to take some of the necessary pre-
liminary distinctions.
THE RELIANCE INTEREST AND HADLEY v. BAXENDALE
Before we discuss the relation between the reliance interest and Hadley
v. Baxendale ° it will be necessary to state briefly what seems to us to
be involved in that famous case, considering it not so much as an event
in legal history but as the accepted symbol for a set of problems. The
case may be said to stand for two propositions: (1) that it is not always
wise to make the defaulting promisor pay for all the damage which fol-
lows as a consequence of his breach, and (2) that specifically the proper
test for determining whether particular items of damage should be com-
pensable is to inquire whether they should have been foreseen by the
promisor at the time of the contract. The first aspect of the case is much
more important than the second. In its first aspect the case bears an
integral relation to the very bases of contract liability. It declares in
effect that just as it is wise to refuse enforcement altogether to some
49. See vox WimsER, SOCIAL EcoNoMIcs (Hinrichs' trans. 1927) §20, "The Problem
of Attribution of Yields". The difficulties in measuring the precise effects of advertising
expenditures on volume of sales and on prices are dealt with in Smith, The Imputation
of Advertising Costs (1935) 45 EcoNoMIC JouRNAL 682.
50. 9 Exch. 341 (1854). The problems involved in the case are penetratingly analyzed
in McCoaRicx, DAMAGES (1935) §§138-141.
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promises (considerationless, unaccepted, "social" promises, etc.) so it
is wise not to go too far in enforcing those promises which are deemed
worthy of legal sanction. The answer to the question of Hadley v. Bax-
endale (where shall we stop?) must inevitably be as complex as the
answer to the question (where shall we begin?) which is implicit in the
law of mutual assent, consideration, and the rules governing the forma-
tion of contracts generally.
In its second aspect Hadley v. Baxendale may be regarded as giving
a grossly simplified answer to the question which its first aspect presents.
To the question, how far shall we go in charging to the defaulting prom-
isor the consequences of his breach, it answers with what purports to
be a single test, that of foreseeability. The simplicity and comprehensive-
ness of this test are largely a matter of illusion. In the first place, it
is openly branded as inappropriate in certain situations where the line
is drawn much more closely in favor of the defaulting promisor than
the test of foreseeability as normally understood would draw it"' There
are, therefore, exceptions to the test, to say nothing of authorities which
reject it altogether as too burdensome to the defaulter."2 In the second
place, it is clear that the test of foreseeability is less a definite test itself
than a cover for a developing set of tests. As in the case of all "reason-
able man" standards there is an element of circularity about the test of
foreseeability. "For what items of damage should the court hold the
defaulting promisor? Those which he should as a reasonable man have
foreseen. But what should he have foreseen as a reasonable man?
Those items of damage for which the court feels he ought to pay."
The test of foreseeability is therefore subject to manipulation by the
simple device of defining the characteristics of the hypothetical man who
is doing the foreseeing. By a gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion this "man acquires a complex personality; we begin to know
just what "he" can "foresee" in this and that situation, and we end,
not with one test but with a whole set of tests. This has obviously hap-
pened in the law of negligence, and it is happening, although less ob-
viously, to the reasonable man postulated by Hadley v. Baxendale.
Even if the reasonable man who does the foreseeing is a juristic
construct, endowed precisely with those qualities which the court feels
he ought to have for the purpose at hand, it does not seem that there is
a complete petitio principii in the test of foreseeability. When we import
into a question of liability the "reasonable man" standard we do at least
two things. In the first place we increase the chance that the case will
ultimately be determined by the jury. Though the court may define the
51. McComicx, DAMAGES (1935) §139.
52. See MCCoRMicm, DAMAGES (1935) §141.
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reasonable man, it cannot be sure that its definition will be regarded by
the jury, and any test which speaks of the reasonable man decreases
the court's chance of removing the case from the jury. In the second
place, whether the case is ultimately decided by the judge or the jury,
stating the problem in terms of the reasonable man creates a bias in
favor of exempting normal or average conduct from legal penalties.
The reasonable man is not necessarily the average man, but he tends to
be, and the notion of what is normal and average puts a bridle on the
judicial power of defining reasonableness. But the restraint is far from
complete. It becomes illusory in those situations where the concepts "nor-
mal" and "average" are without definite content; where the "average man"
is as much a juristic construct as the "reasonable man." The restraint
is often thrown off even in those fields where, because rather definite
lay ways of thought and action are discoverable in them, the notion of
the "normal" and "average" has some objective reality. The courts have
not hesitated to invest the reasonable man with capacities.either greater
or less than those of the average man. For an example of this judicial
autonomy within the reign of fact one need look no further than the
case which originated the test of foreseeability, Hadley v. Baxendale
itself.5"
So much for the general implications of Hadley v. Baxendale. Our
discussion of the relation between that case and the reliance interest
has to do with two distinct problems. First, assuming it is wise to avoid
putting too heavy a penalty on breach of contract, are there cases in
which the reliance interest may be substituted for the expectation interest
as a measure of damages in order to reduce recovery? In this aspect
the question is whether the reliance interest may not serve as a kind of
substitute foi the test of Hadley v. Baxendale. Secondly, what of the
problem of Hadley v. Baxendale as it arises inside the reliance interest
itself ? Should we refuse to grant compensation for acts of reliance where
they are not "proximately caused" by the contract, or were not "reason-
ably foreseeable" by the promisor? We shall discuss these problems in
the order given.
In his pioneering article on culpa in contrahendo Ihering suggested
that the reliance interest (in his terminology, the negative interest) ought
to be the proper measure of recovery in a series of situations which we
may call "not-quite" contracts." For example, in cases where there is
53. "Thus, in Hadley v. Baxendale itself, the carrier was told of the use to which
the broken shaft was to be put and that the mill was shut down, but it was held that
this was not enough, since it was not told that another shaft was not available l"
MCCOR-MICK, DAMAGES (1935) §140.
54. Cidpa in contrahendo oder Schadenersatz bei nichtigen oder nicht sr PerJection
gelangten Vertrigen (1860), published in 1 IHaRING, GESAMMELTE AUFSATZE (1881)
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a misunderstanding concerning the terms of the contract and where, ac-
cordingly, applying a "subjective" theory of mutual assent, we would
arrive at the conclusion that no perfect or complete contract existed, it
may nevertheless be found that the misunderstanding was due predomi-
nantly to the fault of one party, or that the risk of misunderstanding
was created by the act of one of the parties. In this situation it may
be just to impose on the party who was at fault, or whose act created
the risk of misunderstanding, a liability to compensate the "innocent"
party for any actual change of position in reliance on the apparently
perfect contract. 5 Here we stop halfway between full contract liability
(expectation interest) and a denial of liability altogether. In this aspect
the reliance interest bears a resemblance to Hadley v. Baxendale as a
compromise between no enforcement and complete but too onerous en-
forcement of the promise.
We shall discuss in our second installment a number of cases in which
American courts have restricted recovery to the reliance interest perhaps
primarily because they felt that imposing liability for the expectation
interest would be going too far. These cases represent a kind of midway
station between no contract and a "complete" contract. To be sure cases
of this sort are not ordinarily considered as having any special relation-
ship to the problem of Hadley v. Baxendale. tut this is because the two
aspects of that case which we have distinguished above are confused,
and the test of foreseeability is permitted to obscure the more funda-
mental implication of the case, which is that it is unwise to impose too
onerous consequences on breach of contract.
In dealing with the problem of Hadley v. Baxendale as it relates to
the reliance interest itself, it is necessary to recall again the distinction
taken between essential and incidental reliance. So far as essential reli-
ance is concerned, there is usually no occasion to deny reimbursement
for "remote" items, and the problem of Hadley v. Baxendale does not
normally give any difficulty. Applying the test of foreseeability, one
would not hesitate to say that the defaulter should have foreseen that
the plaintiff would undertake those acts necessary to perfect his rights
on the contract. Furthermore, the limitation of recovery by the full con-
327-425. The statement in 1 WmLL soN, Coxnmcrs (1920) §60a, and the intimation
to be derived from combining §60AA and §63A of 1 WUasToN, Corn:crs (2d ed.
1936), that Ihering regarded this liability as founded on tort is incorrect. In fact Ihering
devoted a considerable portion of his article to showing that the liability should be
regarded as contractual.
55. Ihering's suggestion as to this situation was adopted by the German Civil Code,
§122, and the Swiss Code of Obligations, §26. The Swiss Code, however, gives the
judge the discretion to increase damages beyond the reliance interest (presumably to
the expectation interest) if to do so would "correspond to equity".
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tract price is a limitation sufficiently drastic to dispense with the need
for any other device for reducing recovery.56
As to incidental reliance the case is entirely different. Here the lim-
itation of recovery by the full contract price is generally inappropriate.
The definition of this type of reliance being purely negative (it consists
of those acts of reliance which are not "essential" reliance), there is
need for some other limitation on recovery. It would be impossible to
deal adequately in this place with the ways in which courts have solved
this problem. Here as elsewhere the talk is primarily of foreseeability
and notice." Here as elsewhere there is much reason to suspect that
courts are influenced by factors which have nothing to do with fore-
seeability. Particularly apparent is an impulse to preserve some propor-
tion between the liability imposed on the defendant and the compensa-
tion which was paid him under the contract. 8 One also notes that the
items commonly refused tend to fall into fairly definite classes. Thus
where a breach of contract by the defendant makes impossible the un-
dertaking of a business planned by the plaintiff there is discernable a
tendency to deny compensation for sums paid by the plaintiff to em-
ployees, 9 while moving costs and losses on goods are rather regularly
allowed. 0°
56. In those cases where the gross expectancy is too speculative to serve as a sig-
nificant limitation on recovery, the problem of Hadcy v. Brxendale may arise as to
essential reliance. In Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404 (1838), the plaintiff gave up a
profitable law practice in order to enter into a business venture with the defendant.
The court denied reirh'ur~.ement for the loss of the plaintiff's practice on the ground
that it was not a loss c;nised by the defendant's breach-an objection broad enough to
exclude the reliance interest from consideration in any tase. However, since the expec-
tation interest was too conjectural here to offer a significant limitation on recovery, it
is likely that a court willing generally to grant reimbursement for detrimental reliance
would discover that there was here lacking a sufficient "causal" connection between the
loss and the contract, and deny reimbursement on that ground. Woodbury v. Jones,
44 N. H. 206 (1862), is a similar case on its facts and holding.
57. Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 200 Pac. It (1921) ; Bernhard v. Curtis,
75 Conn. 476, 54 At. 213 (1903) ; Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express
Cu., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S. W. (2d) 572 (1932) ; Price v. Eisen, 31 Misc. Rep. 547
64 N. Y. Supp. 405 (1900); Schatzinger Realty Co. v. Stonehill, 19 Ohio C. C. (x. s,)
.403 (1912); Shaboub v. De Lacie, 59 S. W. (2d) 954 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Gross
v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N. W. 952 (1904).
58. The fact that the maximum benefits derivable from the contract by the defendant
were very small in comparison with the liability sought to be imposed on him was
expressly made a basis for denying the relief asked in Rochester Lantern Co. v. Stiles
& Parker Press Co., 135 N. Y. 209, 31 N. E. 1018 (1892), and was no doubt an im-
portant if latent factor in Price v. Eisen, 31 Misc. Rep. 457, 64 N.Y. Supp. 405 (App.
Term 1900), and Koneman v. Seymour, 176 Ill. App. 629 (1913).
59. Konem:,n v. Seymour, 176 Ill. App. 629 (1913); Davis & Major v. Cincinnati,
Hamilton & Dayton R. R. Co., 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 463 (1855); Sinclair Refining Co. v.
Hamilton & Dotson, 164 Va. 203, 178 S. E. 777 (1935); Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis.
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THE RELIANCE INTEREST IN THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS
The distinction which we have taken between three "contract inter-
ests"--the restitution, reliance, and expectation interests-is not to be
found in the Restatement of Contracts. The classificatory scheme of
that work admits only two procedures in dealing with breach of con-
tract. A court may either seek to confer on the plaintiff the value of
the expectancy in the form of damages or specific performance, or it
may grant the plaintiff restitution. There is no tertium quid. This sim-
plification of the problem would be commendable if it really "worked."
Unfortunately, it does not. On the contrary it not only causes the
Restatement to convey a misleading impression of existing law, but
generates confusion within the system of the Restatement itself, par-
ticularly in connection with the subject of restitution.
In the Comment to Section 347 it is said: "In granting restitution
as a remedy for breach . . . the purpose to be attained is the restora-
tion of the injured party to as good a position as that occupied by him
before the contract was made." This passage makes restitution sound
strangely like reimbursement for detrimental reliance, particularly since
in the same context restitution is contrasted with another purpose of
contract law which is that of "putting the injured party in as good a
position as he would have occupied had the contract been fully per-
formed by the defendant." Any hope, however, that the "restitution"
of the Restatement might be broad enough to cover the reliance interest
must be shattered by the express provisions of Section 348 and the
earlier and .much more accurate description of the remedy given in the
comment to Section 326, which describes it in terms of an effort "to
bring about the restitution in value of a performance rendered by the
plaintiff and received by the defendant." The discrepancy in these descrip-
tions of restitution and particularly the (no doubt unintended) identi-
fication of the restitution and reliance interests in the passage first quoted
314, 97 N. V. 952 (1904). Reimbursement for sums paid employees was, however,
granted in Douglas v. Guardian Holding Corp., 132 Cal. App. 585, 23 Pac. (2d) SO
(1933); Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621 (1S96); Walter
Box Co. v. Blackburn, 157 S. NV. 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
There seems also to exist a disinclination to grant reimbursement for the loss involved
in giving up a business in reliance on the contract. Schnierow v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App.
336, 164 Pac. 1132 (1917) ; Williams v. Barton, 13 La. 404 (1838) ("essential reliance");
Woodbury v. Jones, 44 N. H. 206 (1862) ("essential reliance"); Greer v. Varnell,
27 Tex. Civ. App. 255, 65 S. V. 196 (1901). Reimbursement for such a loss was,
however, granted in Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 494, 200 Pac. 11 (1921); and in
Shaboub v. De. Lade, 59 S. IV. (2d) 954 (Tem. Civ. App. 1933) the plaintiff was
allowed to recover for the loss involved in giving up a job in reliance on a contract
by the defendant to lease a filling station which the plaintiff planned to operate.
60. See note 65 infra.
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is symptomatic of an assumption underlying the whole treatment of
contract damages in the Restatement, that reimbursement for detrimental




However uncompromisingly this assumption may be adhered to in
the theoretical passages of the Comments, it might seem that the pro-
visions of Section 333 mark a departure from it. This section provides
for the reimbursement of the plaintiff for his expenditures "reasonably
made in performance of the contract or in necessary preparation there-
for." To one uninitiated in the systematics of the Restatement this might
seem like a rather sweeping recognition of the reliance interest. Yet
even here the relief, though confessedly somewhat exceptional, is brought
within the cover of the expectation interest. "A judgment for such
expenditure, therefore, is a judgment for a portion of the value prom-
ised by the defendant, the receipt of which by the plaintiff is prevented
by the breach." 62 There is no reason to quarrel with this unobjection-
able though certainly tendentious interpretation. There is, however,
much reason tq be disturbed by its negative implications. It seems to
strengthen the inference (already justified on the principle expressio.
unius est exclusio alterius) that Section 333 means to exclude all those
kinds of reliance on a contract which do not take the form of expendi-
tures "made in performance of the contract or in necessary preparation
therefor."
If we treat Section 333, as it seems we must, not as merely illustrative
but as an exclusive enumeration of the kinds of reliance which are com-
pensable, what is the basis for the limitation it contains? Why must the
"expenditures" on the faith of the contract to be compensable consist
of performance of the contract or of preparations to perform? Cer-
tainly this limitation is not to be derived from the cases. It is true
that there are many cases which "support" Section 333 in the sense
that they have granted reimbursement for expenditures made in per-
forming a contract or in preparing to perform it. But they are innocent
61. In making this assumption the RESTATEMENT of course follows the analysis of
most of the legal texts, which strenuously preserve, no doubt for its pedagogical con-
venience, a neat distinction between contract and tort. Professor Williston is particularly
impatient with any attempt to import into contract law what Professor Gardner
(supra, note 37, at 22) calls "the tort principle," i.e., the principle that compensation
should be granted for detrimental reliance. Even the cases granting reimbursement for
reliance which consists of performance of the contract he views, in one place (3
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §1341) as "hard to explain . . . satisfactorily", in
another (§1455) as "erroneous", and in any event (§1340) as "exceptions" to "the
general principle". (It should be noted, however, that it was Professor Corbin, rather
than Professor Williston, who drafted the RESTATEMENT sections relating to damages.)
62. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 333, comment a.
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of any but the vaguest intimations that it is only such expenditures which
are compensable. On the other hand, the cases are legion in which courts
have granted reimbursement for reliance which did not consist of "per-
formance of the contract or necessary preparation therefor." Aside from
an extensive miscellaneous group of cases,a we may note specially two
63. Cases granting reimbursement for expenditures made in anticipation of the arrival
of goods delivered to the defendant for shipment: Gray v. Wabash Ry. Co., 220 Mo.
App. 773, 277 S. V. 64 (1925) ; Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. Express
Co., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S. W. (2d) 572 (1932); *Davis & Major v. Cincinnati,
Hamilton & Dayton R. R. Co., 12 Ohio Dec. Rep. 463 (1855).
Cases granting reimbursement for expenditures in preparing to receie and use goods
which the defendant had contracted to supply: Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. O'Neill-
Adams Co., 185 Fed. 231 (C.C.A. 2d, 1911); *Grosse v. Petersen, 30 Cal. App. 482,
158 Pac. 511 (1916); Harrow Spring Co. v. Whipple Harrow Co., 90 Mich. 147, 51
N. NV. 197 (1892).
Miscellaneous cases: Cohn v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 44 Cal. App. 85, 186 Pac.
200 (1919) (plaintiff, who had bought an engine from the defendant for the purpose of
operating an irrigation pump, recovered, inter alia, reimbursement for the cost of planting
alfalfa seed when the engine failed to operate satisfactorily and the crop was lost);
Dean v. White & Haight, 5 Iowa 266 (1857) (defendant breached a contract to set up
a sawmill for the plaintiff; the plaintiff was permitted to recover for expenses incurred
in procuring an engine and boiler to run the mill) ; Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co.,
56 Kan. 614, 44 Pac. 621 (1896) (defendant broke a contract to supply gas for a glass
factory, the plaintiff was granted, inter alia, reimbursement for the cost of transporting
skilled workmen to operate the factory); American-Hungarian Pub. Co. v. Miles Bros.,
68 Misc. Rep. 334, 123 N. Y. Supp. 879 (1910) (plaintiff granted reimbursement for
expenses incurred in preparing to participate in a display which the defendant had con-
tracted to furnish); Schatzinger Realty Co. v. Stonehill, 19 Ohio C. C. (ns.) 403
(1912) (vendee permitted to recover sums paid to an architect and a contractor in
anticipation of the construction of a building on the land which the defendant had con-
tracted to convey) ; Martin v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 70 S. C. 8, 48 S. E. 616 (1904)
(court held that in the case of a "final and complete breach" by the defendant of its
contract to construct a spur track for the plaintiff, plaintiff entitled to recover reim-
bursement for the cost of moving its sawmill to the site of the promised spur). In
People ex rel Burnham v. Flynn, 189 N. Y. 180, 186, 82 N. E. 169, 171 (1907), there
is a dictum to the effect that the purchaser of a ticket denied admittance to the theater
may recover reimbursement for his expenses incurred in order to attend the performance
(taxi fare?).
In most of the cases cited in this and the two notes following, the objection that
contract damages can only be measured by the expectancy was dismissed by the court
in a very summary fashion. Perhaps the most extended discussion of the point is to be
found in Security Stove & Mfg. Co. v. American Ry. F-press Co., 227 Mo. App. 175,
182, 51 S. NV. (2d) 572, 576 (1932). "Defendant contends that plaintiff 'is endeavoring to
achieve a return of the status quo in a suit based on a breach of contract. Instead of
seeking to recover what he would have had, had the contract not been broken, plaintiff is
trying to recover what he would have had, had there never been any contract of shipment'
. . . It is no doubt, the general rule that where there is a breach of contract the party
suffering the loss can recover only that which he would have had, had the contract not
been broken. . . . But this is merely a general statement of the rule and is not incon-
sistent with the holdings that, in some instances, the injured party may recover expenses
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commonly recurring situations where this type of relief seems as firmly
established as long judicial usage can establish a remedy: (1) the
numerous seed warranty cases granting the disappointed purchaser re-
imbursement for his costs of planting and cultivation;4 and (2) cases
involving contracts to lease premises for business purposes, where the
prospective lessee who is denied possession receives reimbursement for
losses sustained in laying in a stock of goods, for his moving costs,
and generally for out-of-pocket losses."5 Certainly it would be difficult
(though apparently in Georgia it would not be impossible 6) to bring
the items of reliance involved in these cases within the notion of,"per-
formance of the contract or necessary preparations therefor."
incurred in relying upon the contract, although such expenses wofild have been incurred
had the contract not been breached."
(We are indebted to the various state annotations to the RESTATEMENT for assistance
in finding the cases indicated by an asterisk in this note and in note 65 infra, all of
which were cited, without comment, as supporting §333.)
64. Ferris v. Comstock, Ferre & Co., 33 Conn. 513 (1866); Vaughan's Seed Store
v. Stringfellow, 56 Fla. 708, 48 So. 410 (1909); Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 780 (1882);
Crutcher & Co. v. Elliott, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 592 (1892); Moorhead v. Minneapolis Seed
Co., 139 Minn. 11, 165 N. W. 484 (1917); Lundquist v. Jennison, 66 Mont. 516, 214
Pac. 67 (1923) ; Reiger v. Worth Co., 127 N. C. 230, 37 S. E. 217 (1900). The only
reference to the seed warranty cases in the RESTATEMENT is in the fourth illustration
to §331, which indicates that the purchaser can recover the lost profit "if his evidence
gives a sufficient basis for estimating" it. Nothing is said about what happens when
the evidence does not suffice for this purpose.
65. Schnierow v. Boutagy, 33 Cal. App. 336, 164 Pac. 1132 (1917): Douglas v.
Guardian Holding Corp., 132 Cal. App. 585, 23 Pac. (2d) 80 (1933); *Bernhard v.
Curtis, 75 Conn. 476, 54 AtI. 213 (1903); *Musial v. Kudlick, 87 Conn. 164, 87 Atl.
551 (1913); Koneman v. Seymour, 176 IIl. App. 629 (1913); Tidwell v. Meyer Bros.,
160 La. 778, 107 So. 571 (1926) ; Narragansett Amusement Co. v. Riverside Park Amuse-
ment Co., 260 Mass. 265, 157 N. E. 532 (1927) ; *Driggs v. Dwight, 17 Wend. 71 (N. Y.
1837); Giles v. O'Toole, 4 Barb. 261 (N. Y. 1848); Walter Box Co. v. Blackburn,
157 S. W. 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913); Texas Power & Light Co. v. Roberts, 187 S. W.
225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916) ; Shaboub v. De Lacie, 59 S. W. (2d) 954 (Tex. Civ. App.
1933) ; Gross v. Heckert, 120 Wis. 314, 97 N. W. 952 (1904) ; Nurse v. Barns, T. Raym.
77 (1664) ; see Hodges v. Fries, 34 Fla. 63, 74, 15 So. 682, 685 (1894). But cf. Rhodes
v. Baird, 16 Ohio St. 573 (1866).
66. Almost identical in its effect with the main provision of §333 of the RESTATEMENT
is §20-1414 of the GEORGIA CODE (1933) which reads, "Any necessary expense which
one of the two contracting parties incurs in complying with the contract may be re-
covered as damages." In Butler v. Moore, 68 Ga. 780, 783 (1882), a case in which
the plaintiff had bought seed for his own use, the court said, " . . . if the seed were
worthless, the measure of damages would be the purchase money with interest and
any expense incurred in complying with the contract after the same was entered into,
such as the hauling of the seed, preparing the lands for planting, sowing, and rolling
said seed. . ... " (Italics ours.) Surely here was an object lesson for those who
drafted §3331 If courts ever develop toward the RESTATEMENT the same treacherous
deference they display toward codes, we may perhaps expect to see §333 tortured in a
similar manner. Section 333, however, presents an obstacle to judicial ingenuity which
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Does any other section of the Restatement offer these cases of "in-
cidental reliance" the haven which Section 333 denies them? (For it
will be observed that the practical effect of the limitation in Section
333 is to exclude what we have called "incidental reliance" and to limit
reimbursement to "essential reliance.") Hope for such a haven might
at first be derived from the broad language of Section 329, which states
that contract damages will be given for the "net amount of the losses
caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach." The term "losses
caused by the defendant's breach" might seem broad enough to include
any kind of detrimental reliance, whatever its nature. But the hope
that this term can serve as a general cover for the reliance interest must
be short-lived. The comment to Section 333 declares that expenditures
made by the plaintiff in performing his contract cannot be considered
as "losses caused by the defendant's breach." 7 If such e.-xpenditures are
not losses caused by breach then certainly other kinds of detrimental
reliance are not. Apparently the term "losses caused" as used in Section
329, far from being identical with detrimental reliance, is intended
merely to include those cases where the breach of a contract inflicts
some direct harm, as where a cow warranted to be free from disease
infects the purchaser's herd. The illustrations to Section 329 imply
as much.
The conclusion then must be that reimbursement for reliance which
does not consist of performance of the contract or preparations to per-
form is excluded from the Restatement. It is excluded from its theory,
from its express provisions, and from its illustrations.a9 It is excluded
not simply in the sense that it receives no explicit recognition. That
would be understandable; a neglect of nuances in judicial treatment is
inevitable in an attempt to reduce to twenty sections the whole law of
contract damages. It is excluded in the sense that the systematics of
the Restatement leaves no gap through which it can effect an entry.
It is not only uninvited to the feast, but the doors are barred against
its intrusion.
is lacking in the Georgia Code, in the form of a limitation of recovery by "the full
contract price". It is difficult to imagine how the relief granted in Butlr v:. Moore
would have been possible with such a limitation.
67. Comment a. See also the cases cited in note 56 stpra.
68. Paola Gas Co. v. Paola Glass Co., 56 Kam 614, 44 Pac. 621 (1896), a case in
which the defendant by failing to perform its contract to supply gas rendered vain large
expenditures by the plaintiff for a glass factory, serves twice as an illustration in the
RESTATEmExT. See §329, the sixth illustration; and §331, the sixth illustration to sub-
se.tion (1). In both illustrations the discussion hinges entirely on the problem of
proving the profits expected to be derived from the operations of the factory, whereas
in the actual case, expected profits were rejected as too conjectural and reimbursement
was granted for the costs involved in establishing the factory. Needless to say, Gas v.
Glass does not reappear as an illustration to §333.
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We have said that reimbursement for "incidental" reliance is excluded
from the illustrations of the Restatement. This is nearly, but not quite
true. There is perhaps no more striking demonstration of the artifici-
ality of the restriction imposed in Section 333 than the fact that it
seems to have been ignored in two of the illustrations given under that
section. In the fifth illustration A conveys lots to B in return for B's
promise to build a hotel on them. A then pays $5,000 to an architect
for plans for the hotel. On breach of contract by B this item of expense
is regarded as compensable. Was this an act by A which constituted
"performance of the contract or . . . necessary preparation therefor"?
If so, there is nothing in the illustration to indicate that it was.
The seventh illustration is based on Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co. 9 In that case the defendant was under contract to sell
oil to the plaintiff to be delivered at the seller's mill. The plaintiff sent
its tank cars for the oil. On breach by the defendant the plaintiff sought
reimbursement for the freight paid on these cars. There is no intima-
tion in the discussion of the illustration that this could not be regarded
as a compensable act of reliance within Section 333. But was.it a part
of the plaintiff's performance of the contract that he ship cars from
a distance? As Justice Holmes said in the actual case, " . . . it is
obvious that the plaintiff was free to bring its tanks from where it liked,
-a thousand miles away or from an adjoining yard,-so far as the
contract was concerned."'7 ° Of .course one could say that in shipping
its tanks the plaintiff was preparing to perform "its contract to receive
the oil" and that under the circumstances, since the cars were not in
an "adjoining yard," sending the cars from a distance was a necessary
act of preparation. But where is the line to be drawn? Was the plaintiff
in Nurse v. Barn " preparing to perform his contract to lease the prem-
ises when he bought a stock of goods, on the theory that it was only
through this act that he would be able to earn the money to pay his
rent ?
The questions just raised reveal the fact that the limitation in Section
333 not only does not accurately reflect the law, but that it suffers from
an ambiguity, or rather from a series of ambiguities. The difficulty of
deciding just how closely connected an act must be with "performance
of the contract" before it can be regarded as "necessary preparation
therefor" has just been mentioned. But there are other difficulties fully
as embarrassing as this one. Does the term "performance of the con-
tract" imply that the plaintiff must himself have been under a duty?
If so, then Section 333 is limited to bilateral contracts, and expenditures
69. 190 U.S. 540 (1903), discussed supra p. 83.
70. Id. at 545.
71. T. Raymond 77 (1664), discussed smipra p. 77.
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made in reliance on an offer for a unilateral contract are excluded. Does
Section 333 preclude measuring damages by the amount of detrimental
reliance in the case of promises made enforceable by Section 90? As
to such promises the term "performance" is certainly inappropriate. The
nephew in Devecmon v. Shaw"2 was not "performing" anything; he
was merely relying on a promise. Yet it is precisely as to such promises
that it is often wise to limit recovery to the reliance interest.
Since there seems so little to justify an exclusion of incidental reliance
from compensation, our final question must be, why was Section 333
phrased exclusively in terms of "performance of the contract" and "nec-
essary preparations" to perform? There are probably a good many
reasons. In the first place, such reliance, which is roughly equivalent
to what we have called "essential reliance," may be brought within the
conceptual cover of the expectancy. It can be fitted into a system which
excludes reimbursement for detrimental reliance from the objects legit-
imately pursued by contract law. It would not have been so easy to deal
with "incidental reliance" in the same way. In the second place, the
cases involving recovery for expenditures for performance or prepara-
tions to perform are the most easily classified of the cases granting
reimbursement for reliance. Accordingly, they form the subject of
special sections in the texts and digests."3 The cases involving other
types of reliance have been less systematically dealt with. They are to
be found lurking under such deceptive titles as, "No recovery for lost
profits," the annotator having neglected to say that there is recovery for
lost efforts. In the third place, two of the limitations imposed in Sec-
tion 333 would as they now stand have been inappropriate as applied to
incidental reliance. These are subsection (b), which deals with the prob-
lem of double recovery, and subsection (a), which provides that the
total recovery may in no event exceed "the full contract price." (Ijt
should be observed that the limitation of subsection (a) destroys any
hope that by a broad interpretation of "performance" and "preparations
to perform" the courts might within the framework of Section 333 be
able to make adequate provision for reimbursing incidental reliance.)
Lastly, there may have been a feeling that if compensable reliance were
too broadly extended the difficulty of Hadley v. Ba.xendale would become
embarrassingly acute. That there is a real difficulty here must be ad-
mitted, but Section 333 seems much too simple and drastic a cure for it.
Our discussion of the Restatement so far has related wholly to its
72. 69 Md. 199, 14 Atl. 464 (1888). It should be noted that so far as restitution is
ccncerned the RESTATEMENT makes express provision for cases of this type. §347 (1)
(b).
73. Title "Damages" in 17 C. J. §126, and 8 R. C. L §56; 3 Wiu.srox, Co.=Acrs
(1920) §1341; 6 PAGE, CoRraAcrs (2d ed. 1922) §3208.
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failure to take account of "incidental reliance." Even as to "essential
reliance" it should be noted, however, that the Restatement conveys a
misleading impression of the case law. In our discussion of the problem
of Hadley v. Baxendale we referred to cases in which courts have de-
liberately restricted recovery to the reliance interest even where the
expectation interest could be easily proved. These cases find no echo
in the Restatement. Section 333 is phrased in terms of a plaintiff's
option, and the only obstacle to a recovery "of the expectation interest
which it recognizes is the difficulty of proof. That in some situations
another and very formidable obstacle may be encountered in the form
of a judicial determination to confine legal protection to the reliance
interest will be shown in our second installment.
